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1. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION
Politics is about ideology. Democratic mass politics, therefore, is about the competition 
of ideologies in the public sphere. While the concept of ideology is one of the most  
contested in the social sciences, its core characteristic is coherence: “Ideology, at the  
very least, refers to a set of idea-elements that are bound together […] in a non-random 
fashion” (Gerring 1997). Similarly, Sartori (1969: 401) argues that such belief systems 
are  characterized  by  „a  state  of boundedness,  to the fact  that  beliefs hang together“ 
(italics in the original). 
From this  notion of coherence,  however,  follows a  minimum degree of complexity: 
value orientations are necessarily linked to each other in order to constitute an ideology.  
If ideologies are complex by their very nature, there is a need for simplification in the 
communication between actors in the political sphere of a mass democracy. Fortunately,  
language  provides  us  with  terms  that  are  able  to  fulfill  the  task  of  simplifying  the 
complexity of ideologies and therefore facilitate political communication. Arguably, the  
most prominent such terms in European democracies are those of left and right (Fuchs  
and Klingemann 1990; Knutsen 1995; Laponce 1981).
Dating back to the time of the French Revolution, the notions of left and right have 
come to function as a spatial representation of opposed ideologies. Moreover, left and 
right  do  not  only  denote  opposite  ideological  poles,  but  they  span  an  ideological 
continuum along which actors and policies can be placed (Laponce 1981: 27). On the 
basis of its spatial nature the left-right dimension has developed a considerable amount 
of “absorptive power” (Knutsen 1995: 87), that is, the capacity to accommodate a wide 
variety of policy issues. Therefore, one underlying assumption of this work is that the 
value orientations associated with the terms left and right not only changed over time 
(Inglehart  1977; Kitschelt  and Hellemans 1990; Knutsen 2002) but also vary across 
political  systems.  In  order  to  further  examine  the  latter  conjecture,  the  following 
research question will be addressed:
What are the differences in the meaning of the left-right dimension across Europe?
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As  ideological  competition  lies  at  the  very  heart  of  democratic  politics,  it  is  of  
considerable interest to the political sciences to clarify the extent to which European  
citizens refer to the same values when using the terms left and right. The greater the 
cross-national variation in the meaning of left and right, the more carefully this concept 
should be applied in a comparative perspective. 
From the research question outlined above, it becomes clear that the task at hand is a  
genuinely comparative endeavour. As Almond et al. (2001: 39) put it, „[c]omparison is 
the methodological core of the scientific study of politics“. Not only does it foster our 
understanding of the respective case (be it a party, a political system or – as in this case 
–  value  orientations  at  the  societal  level),  but  it  contributes  to  the  identification  of  
causalities that cannot be detected by investigating only single cases.
What is more, there are specific reasons why such a comparative study of ideology at 
the mass public level is relevant for the case of Europe. Against the background of the 
process of European Integration which leads some academics to expect that „the main 
dimension  of  EU politics  should  shift  from ‘integrationists’ against  ‘nationalists’ to 
traditional left-right divisions“ (Hix 2008: 1255), it is of great significance to examine 
the extent to which the left-right semantics comprise a core of shared references to 
certain values and beliefs. To put it simply: the higher the agreement as to the meaning 
of left and right across Europe, the more valuable the terms will be in describing the  
structure of political competition within the institutional and the public sphere of the 
European Union.
No less than seventeen out of 21 countries included in this study are EU member states 
(the non-members being Switzerland, Israel, Norway, and Russia) . Due to the absence 
of  predominantly  small  countries  the  respective  data  account  for  more  than  three 
quarters  of  the  European  Union’s  population.  It  can  therefore  be  expected  that  the 
results  of  this  study  are  of  relevance  in  highlighting  the  utility  of  the  left-right 
dimension as a European political conflict structure.
As  will  later  be  argued  in  more  detail,  one  of  the  main  functions  of  the  left-right 
dimension  is  to  serve  as  a  communication  tool  by  simplifying  complex  ideological  
conflicts into a bipolar spatial archetype. The value content associated with the terms  
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left  and  right  is  likely  to  vary  with  the  specific  conflicts  that  shaped  the  political 
landscape of a country through the course of modern history.
In order to answer the research question outlined above, I first present an overview of 
theoretical approaches to the functions of the left-right dimension. I distinguish between 
the function of spatial representation of ideological conflict on the one hand and the 
communication and orientation function in the public sphere on the other. It has to be 
borne in mind, however, that these two functions are not separable but rather represent 
two sides of the same medal.
These  two  complementary  functions  of  the  left-right  continuum  are,  however, 
constrained by the fact that their respective logics are potentially conflicting. Whereas 
the  ideological  function  is  rooted  in  the  capacity  of  the  left-right  semantics  to 
accommodate a broad range of ideological conflicts, the communication function might  
be constrained by too great a number of policy issues being associated with left and  
right. 
In accordance with a vast array of scholarly literature (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; 
Knutsen  1995;  Freire  2006,  2008)  three  components  of  the  left-right  schema  are 
discussed: the socio-structural component refers to divisions between social groups as 
the  basis  of  ideological  conflict,  the  most  prominent  being  the  class  cleavage.  The 
partisan component  reflects  party  identification that  is  translated into left-right  self-
placement by individuals. The focus of this study, however, is on the value component, 
that is, on the relation between left-right self-placement and beliefs held by individuals.
This threefold component structure of the left-right dimension mirrors the concept of a 
cleavage as defined by a number of scholars (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Knutsen 1995). 
Cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) will, however, provide another important  
contribution to the theoretical groundwork that this study builds on. As the left-right 
semantics may refer to different political conflicts at different times, it is essential to 
understand  the  historical  significance  of  different  cleavages  and  their  relation  to 
different  socio-structural  variables  such  as  the  economic  state  or  the  religious 
stratifications of a given society.
That  is  why  a  part  of  the  theoretical  section  in  this  study  sketches  the  historical 
evolution  of  the  left-right  terminology.  From their  first  use  in  a  political  context  –  
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namely that of the French Revolution – through the nineteenth century, the terms left 
and right shifted from denoting republican-monarchist or secular-religious conflict lines 
to representing the opposing groups and ideologies in the class conflict that, reinforced  
by the extension of the suffrage in many Western European countries, became the most 
significant cleavage of European societies for most of the nineteen hundreds. Only in 
the final decades of the twentieth century has there been an increase of non-economic  
societal conflicts: the environment, immigration, cultural issues and the like have not 
only turned attention away from the typical socio-economic issues of the class conflict. 
They also gave rise to a new family of parties on either side of the political spectrum. 
Right-wing populists or radicals and left-libertarian or green parties might have little in 
common  –  but  both  groups  attracted  considerable  support  in  the  electorate  on  a 
primarily non-economic policy platform. Thus, the meaning of left and right has been 
transformed during the past  decades from being predominantly about class issues to 
encompass non-material value orientations as well.
As a reflection of the most significant historical conflict lines running through European 
societies and in line with existing scholarly works about the left-right dimension (e. g.  
Knutsen 1995; Freire 2006, 2008; Middendorp 1992), three ideological dimensions are 
then chosen to serve as indicators for the left-right self-identification of individuals:  
religiosity, socio-economic values and authoritarian-libertarian beliefs.
Finally,  the  theoretical  part  concludes  with  a  discussion  of  different  theoretical 
approaches  to  the  changing  meaning  of  the  left-right  dimension  (Kitschelt  and 
Hellemans  1990)  and  a  section  concerned  with  the  causal  direction  between  value 
orientations  and  self-placement  on  the  left-right  scale.  It  is  argued  that  the  former 
influences the latter rather than the other way round.
Based on this theoretical groundwork, the third chapter presents six hypotheses to be  
tested empirically – two pertaining to each of the three value dimensions. All of the 
hypotheses refer to patterns of similarity and difference between European societies. For 
instance, a division between predominantly Protestant and non-Protestant countries is 
conjectured on the basis of cleavage theory. Further, there are assumptions referring to  
the role of the communist legacy in Eastern Europe and the effects of postwar economic 
prosperity in most parts of Western Europe.
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Survey  data  from  the  most  recent  European  Social  Survey  (ESS)  are  used  to 
operationalize the research question and the respective variables will then be employed 
multivariate regression analyses. On the basis of these first results, I will discuss cross-
national similarities and differences in the value orientations that are associated with the  
left-right dimension. At this point,  some preliminary outcomes indicating whether to 
accept  or  reject  the  reasoning  behind  some  of  the  six  hypotheses  will  already  be 
available.  However,  other country-level  data  (such as economic measures or figures 
about  religious  denominations)  will  be  necessary  to  fully  assess  the  validity  of  the 
assumptions made.
The  ultimate  aim  of  this  study,  however,  is  to  identify  meaningful  groupings  of  
countries. This task is performed by means of cluster analysis which categorizes the 21 
European countries according to their respective left-right value profile. 
The final chapter sums up the results of the analysis and draws conclusions as to the 
possible precautions of using the left-right dimension in a comparative perspective.
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2. THEORETICAL GROUNDWORK
Left  and  right  are,  first  and  foremost,  dichotomous  terms  denoting  the  horizontal  
dimension  of  physical  space.  The  transfer  of  these  terms  to  the  political  sphere  is  
fostered not only by the fact that politics lends itself to the use of spatial metaphors 
(Benoit and Laver 2006: 14 ff.). What is more, the left-right duality possesses qualities  
that set it apart from other dichotomies: First, left-right is non-hierarchical, that is, it  
does not assign more value, greater power, or higher priority to either pole, as would up-
down or back-front (Laponce 1975: 17); second, it can “easily be transformed into a 
continuum” (Laponce 1981: 27) with a centre positioned in between the two extremes (I 
use the terms dimension, continuum and schema more or less interchangeably in this  
study); and third, the notions of left and right are present in all cultures, so that the use  
of  this  spatial  reference  is,  at  least  in  principle,  not  limited  geographically.  The 
consequences  implicit  therein  for  the  application  of  left  and  right  as  an  ideological 
schema are discussed in the following. 
2.1. The functions of the left-right dimension
Two main  functions  are  identified  in  the  literature  on  the  left-right  dimension,  one 
referring to ideological conflict (e. g. Inglehart and Klingemann 1976), the other to the 
role of left-right semantics as a means of communication between actors in a polity (e. 
g.  Arian  and  Shamir  1984).  These  functions,  however,  cannot  be  viewed  entirely 
separated from each other,  but  have  to  be  regarded as  interdependent  and mutually 
reinforcing. For the purpose of this work, however, it  seems apt to distinguish them  
analytically, since it will later be argued that the communications function of left and 
right is possibly hampered by disagreement as to the content of the ideological conflict  
that is denoted by the left-right semantics.
2.1.1. The spatial representation of ideological conflict
Left  and right  are  archetypes that  perfectly lend themselves to represent  ideological  
conflict in a one-dimensional space. Consequently, the left-right continuum comes to 
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serve  as  a  political  schema  and  thus  helps  „people  order  the  elements  of  their  
environment“ (Conover and Feldman 1984: 96).
Historically,  the  non-hierarchical  qualities  of  the  left-right  dimension  rendered  it  a 
suitable tool for the illustration of political struggle at a time when the long-established 
dominance of  the monarch,  the nobility  and the high clergy was questioned by the 
bourgeoisie. It is therefore hardly surprising that the establishment of left and right as a  
metaphor for ideological conflict dates back to late eighteenth century France.
Following  the  French  Revolution,  the  seating  arrangements  in  the  French  National 
Assembly of 1789 placed the high clergy and the nobility on the right, the low clergy 
and the members of the Third Estate on the left (for a detailed description see Laponce 
1981: 47–52). This division was never solely one between groups of different social 
status but  also one along lines of  ideological  conflict  over  the adaptation of  a  new 
constitution.  The  coincidence  of  spatial  and  ideological  divisions  provided  the 
foundation for the transformation of left  and right from purely spatial  terms into an 
ideological concept. In the course of the nineteenth century, this concept spread from 
France to the rest of Europe and farther around the globe through two channels: „the 
language of parliamentary democracy and the language of socialism“ (Laponce 1981: 
52). Thus, the primary dimension of ideological conflict was given the same name in a  
great number of polities. 
In the wake of the French Revolution, the right became linked with support  for the 
ancien régime, whereas the left stood for ideas of revolutionary change. The fact that 
left and right are still used more than 200 years after the first meeting of the French 
National Assembly shows that, while the specific meaning of left and right has without 
doubt  changed  considerably  since  the  late  18th century,  the  function  as  a  spatial 
representation of ideological conflict remains the same. In other words, the ideological 
function of the left-right dimension is to represent „a super-issue which summarizes the 
programmes of opposing groups“ (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976: 244). 
It has to be added, however, that the vast majority of individuals today do not as a rule  
think of left and right in strictly ideological terms but rather have an „understanding of  
those labels […] at a basic and unsophisticated level“ (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 
205). Nevertheless, a great share of the populace in European countries (and elsewhere) 
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can make use of the terms left and right – whatever the meaning associated with them. 
What is more, despite a majority of voters not exhibiting an ideologically consistent set 
of preferences, Feld and Grofman (1988) have shown that the likelihood of a group to  
display ideological consistency is greater than that of individual members of that group.
The nature of the ideological conflict associated with left and right varies considerably 
over time. Knutsen (1995: 66), for instance, holds that “religious/secular values were 
the  central  conflict  line  emerging  from pre-industrial  society”  and therefore  closely  
connected to the left-right dimension – a view that is supported by Laponce’s (1970, 
1972) findings. In contrast, Lipset et al. (1954: 1135) do not refer to specifically secular  
value  orientations  when  characterizing  the  left  as  “advocating  social  change  in  the 
direction  of  greater  equality  –  political,  social  or  economic”.  Summing up  all  such 
phenomena,  Arend  Lijphart  (1990)  identifies  no  less  than  seven  dimensions  of 
ideological  conflict  that  are  present  in  Western  European  polities,  all  of  which  are 
possibly related to the left-right dimension in one way or another.
From these examples it becomes clear that the left-right dimension can accommodate  
quite different sorts of ideological conflict and owes much of this “absorptive power” 
(Knutsen 1995: 87) to its primal meaninglessness in ideological terms, that is, the fact 
that the left-right semantics do not literally account for ideological content. In contrast,  
the labels  “liberal”  and “conservative” (for  an in-depth discussion see Conover  and 
Feldman 1981), whilst being seen as “functional equivalents” (Fuchs and Klingemann 
1990: 203, footnote 2) to left and right, are by their very nature much less flexible as to 
the incorporation of a vast variety of ideological conflict lines, because they represent  
ideological labels themselves. 
Yet, the versatility of the left-right dimension is additionally furthered by its possible 
application  to  a  wide  variety  of  objects:  individuals,  social  groups,  political  actors,  
institutions,  parties,  governments,  but  also  single  statements,  policies,  values, 
ideologies, et cetera. We can therefore conclude that not only the absorptive but also the 
applicative power of left and right adds to the terms’ prevalence as the most important 
denotations of opposing political objects.
2.1.2. Left and right as a means of communication and orientation
Supplementary to its role as a dimension of ideological conflict, the left-right schema 
serves as a tool for communication and orientation in the political sphere. In general,  
schemata are „used by individuals to process efficiently new information and retrieve 
memories“ (Langford 1991: 478). As Fuchs and Klingemann (1990: 203) put it, the left-
right  continuum  can  be  considered  an  instrument  “that  citizens  can  use  to  orient 
themselves in the political world“. Knutsen (2002: 31) holds a similar view but further 
specifies that  the left-right  dimension “for individuals […] has primarily orientation 
functions, and for the political system communication functions”.
Some scholars, most notably Arian and Shamir (1983) would even go so far to say that 
the  communication  and  orientation  function  is  the  only  function  that  the  left-right  
continuum has for mass publics: “The left-right concept for most people is not ideology, 
nor does it influence their vote” (ibid.: 140). Consequently, left and right hardly ever  
refer to ideological beliefs held by individuals or groups, but must be seen as “political 
labels” denoting objects in the political sphere, most frequently parties. 
The underlying assumptions of this work, however, are less rigid. In accordance with 
most  research,  the  function  of  the  left-right  dimension  as  a  “political  esperanto” 
(Laponce  1981:  54)  must  be  seen both as  complementary to  and dependent  on the  
ideological function. The logics of both functions, however, are potentially conflicting. 
Whereas  the  semantic  versatility  of  left  and  right  was  highlighted  before  as  a 
precondition of its universal use in denoting ideological conflict,  the communication 
function may be hampered by the concept becoming too flexible. To put it simply: if left  
and right can refer to anything, the meaning of the terms will be lost.
Thus, for the left-right dimension to function properly as a communication tool across 
sociological strata and even cultures, the middle ground between two extremes needs to 
be occupied. On the one hand, ideological conflicts in general must be simplified in 
order to fit the plain dichotomy of left and right. This means that complex patterns of 
struggle  over  value  beliefs  have  to  be  broken  down  into  a  unidimensional  form. 
Oversimplification, on the other hand, can lead to uncertainty as to the boundaries of the  
left-right-schema.
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In  Fuchs  and  Klingemann’s  (1990:  206  f.)  words,  there  is  a  tension  between  the 
„symbolic  generalization“  and  the  „limitation“  of  the  left-right  concept,  the  former  
referring  to  its  absorptive  capacities  outlined  above,  the  latter  to  the  need  for  
specification  of  its  content.  The  research  question  driving  this  work  is  ultimately 
sparked by this tension, for it aims to highlight whether the amount of generalization 
necessary for a shared understanding of left and right by different social entities (in this 
case: national populations) allows for sufficient limitation of the concept as required for  
efficient communication.
2.1.3. The left-right semantics as a cognitive schema
The two functions of the left-right dimension that have been presented here roughly 
reflect two strands of a scientific argument about the nature of belief systems in mass 
publics.  To put it  simply,  the core of the debate is  about ideological consistency of 
individuals’ beliefs and value orientations. For instance, the seminal work of Converse  
(1964) implied that,  in order for the left-right (or liberal-conservative) dimension to 
make  sense  beyond  well-informed  elite  groups,  there  must  be  consistency  between 
ideological self-placement and political values and beliefs amongst large portions of the  
electorate (e. g. Nie and Andersen 1974).
Other  authors  stress  the  fact  that  only  a  minority  of  individuals  tend  to  display 
ideologically consistent political views, which is why the left-right dimension should be 
„disconnected from their close linkage with the concept of ideological thinking“ (Fuchs 
and Klingemann 1990: 204).
If, however, we cannot expect to find at the individual level a connection between value  
orientations and left-right self-identification, the research task of this study appears to  
be  in  vain.  Yet,  some  qualifications  have  to  be  made  concerning  the  question  of 
ideological  consistency.  First  of  all,  Fuchs  and  Klingemann  (1990:  205)  raise  an 
important  issue  in  their  arguing  that  the  left-right  continuum  can  still  serves  as  a 
meaningful device: the „individual-level function must be augmented by a social  or 
systemic perspective“.
It is therefore important to clarify at this point that the analysis here is not concerned 
with ideological consistency at the individual level, but that the object of interest is the  
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relation between left-right self-identification and certain beliefs and political attitudes at  
the societal level.
That  said,  it  is  essential  to  point  out  that  individuals  and  (large)  groups  differ 
considerably in their tendencies to display preferences that are ideologically consistent.  
Feld and Grofman (1988) provide theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for the 
phenomenon that (1) the ideological consistency of a group is not necessarily a linear 
function  of  the  share  of  individuals  with  single-peaked preference  orderings  in  that 
group;  and (2)  that  collectivities  tend to  exhibit  ideologically  consistent  preferences 
even when a large portion of individuals do not fulfill this criterion.
Feld  and  Grofman  (1988:  786)  make  an  important  distinction  in  their  explaining 
argument:
It is important to distinguish between the question whether members of a society agree with each other  
about preferences and the question whether they agree with each other about the continuum along which  
alternatives are to be evaluated. In other words, collectivities can agree, in the aggregate, on what we  
might call the „terms of the debate,“ while having great disagreement as individuals about what is the best 
choice.
Given  the  long-standing  use  of  the  left-right  dimension  for  denoting  structures  of  
political  conflict,  there  is  good reason to  believe  that  this  continuum is  profoundly 
established and therefore represents a well-known background against which to evaluate 
political actors, policies or political views.
Such a background has been termed „schema“ by cognitive psychologists. A schema 
can  be  described  as  a  formation  of  previously  obtained  knowledge  by  which  new 
perceptions are ordered and connected to older information. As Conover and Feldman 
(1984: 96) put it, schemas „lend organization to an individual’s experience in the sense 
that people order the elements of their environment to reflect the structure of relevant 
schemas“.
The findings of Feld and Grofman (1988) clearly indicate that the left-right dimension 
serves as such a schema, especially at the societal level, where it represents a widely 
„shared continuum“ (Feld and Grofman 1988: 786).
However,  while  constituting  one  of  the  most  relevant  schemas  for  an  individual’s 
organization  of  political  views,  the  left-right  continuum is  far  from being  the  only 
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belief-related  schema that  people  use.  What  is  more,  the  schema concept  basically  
applies to the individual level. Since the concern here is the group or societal level of 
value orientations, I do not posit that all value orientations examined at the individual 
level  relate  to  the  left-right  schema.  It  will,  however,  be  argued  that  the  left-right 
dimension  due  to  its  long-standing  history  is  sufficiently  established  in  European  
societies so that there is considerable agreement as to the relevance of this schema.
In other  words,  the  results  of  this  analysis  might  highlight  the  extent  of  agreement 
concerning  the  relevance  or  usefulness  of  the  left-right  schema  in  organizing  and 
evaluating certain sets of value orientations.
2.1.4. Left and right as social representations
In a recent article, Corbetta et al. (2009) put forward another way of interpreting the 
political terms left and right. Drawing on social psychology, they argue that the left-
right semantics bear the characteristics of social representations which they describe as  
follows:
They  are  forms  of  social  knowledge:  systems  of  values,  beliefs,  opinions,  semantic  repertoires  and 
theories of common sense resulting from a process of reconstruction of reality into a symbolic system 
elaborated in relation to socially relevant objects through communicative exchanges between people in  
groups and communities (Corbetta et al. 2009: 625)
Similar to a schema, social representations serve as a means for organizing knowledge 
by  reducing  complexity  in  patterns  of  information.  Therefore  they  function  as  a 
common semantic ground to which communication between individuals can refer. 
However, in addition to fulfilling these tasks, social representations are characterized by 
the fact that they are made up of a stable semantic core and a periphery of meanings that 
is prone to change across time and space. This concept bears similarities with Laponce’s 
(1981) model of stable meanings at the core of the left-right dimension and an altering 
set of variable terms and objects located more distant from the core.
Corbetta et al. (2009) present empirical evidence from mass surveys conducted in Italy  
between 1968 and 2006, thus suggesting that such a core-periphery structure exists for 
the  left-right  dimension.  Respondents  were  asked  open-ended  questions  about  their 
associations  with  the  terms  left  and  right.  While  abstract  notions  in  respondents’ 
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answers remain stable and even increase in importance over the observed time period, 
the number of peripheral  – that  is:  more concrete – associations with left  and right  
declines. 
This  appears  logical  considering  the  massive  rearrangements  the  Italian  party  and 
political system underwent during the early nineties. With party ties loosened and the 
political  system  in  turmoil,  the  peripheral  elements  (e.  g.  parties  or  party  leaders)  
associated  with  the  left-right  semantics  are  likely  to  be  even  more  unstable  and  
individuals  increasingly  associate  more  abstract  core  elements  with  the  left-right  
dimension.
Corbetta et al. (2009: 630 f.) define four levels of abstraction between the core and the  
periphery meanings of the left-right dimension: references to (1) political actors (e. g.  
government/opposition),  (2)  social  groups  and  class/religious  cleavages  (e.  g.  the 
workers/the  rich/the  clerics),  (3)  the  state  or  social  order  (e.  g.  an  economic 
dimension/democracy/social  change),  and (4)  general  or  ideological  principles (e.  g. 
equality/socialism/fascism). For the purpose of this study it can be contended that the 
operationalization  of  the  research  question  works  at  the  two  intermediate  levels  of  
abstraction. As will be outlined in section 3.2, specific issues such as church attendance, 
state intervention in the economy, or immigration – equivalent to the second level of  
abstraction in Corbetta et al. (2009) – will be used to capture the role of three more  
abstract dimensions: a religious, a socio-economic, and a libertarian-authoritarian one – 
corresponding to the third level of abstraction.
This intermediate strategy seems apt for the task at hand since a too concrete mode of 
operationalization would obstruct cross-national comparison whereas a more abstract 
approach runs the risk of yielding too little variation between countries.
2.2. The components of the left-right dimension 
The terms left and right can be applied to different classes of objects. Following a vast 
array of scholarly literature (e. g. Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Huber 1989; Knutsen 
1989,  1995,  1997;  Freire  2006,  2008),  I  distinguish  between  a  socio-structural,  a 
partisan, and a value component of the left-right dimension. These three elements reflect  
the  structure  of  a  cleavage  as  defined  by  Bartolini  and  Mair  (1990):  empirical, 
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organizational, and normative. As the research question here refers to the normative,  
that is, the value component of the left-right dimension, the former two are only briefly 
discussed.
2.2.1. The socio-structural component of the left-right dimension
Social  conflict  lines  more  often  than  not  run  along  socio-structural  divisions,  most 
typically the class cleavage during the industrial era. It is, therefore, hardly surprising 
that these divisions are incorporated into the left-right schema. As Freire puts it, the 
socio-structural component of the left-right dimension refers to „connections between 
citizens’ locations in the social structure, plus their corresponding social identities, and 
their left–right orientation“ (Freire 2006: 360). 
In the days of the French Revolution, the Third Estate embodied the left, the nobles and 
the clergy the right. Following the Industrial Revolution, the manual workers became 
the social basis of the left pole, the employers and producers found themselves on the 
right.
As a consequence of the expansion of the third sector and the decrease of the manual 
labour force in European societies, there is widely held belief amongst scholars that the 
role  of  the  socio-structural  component  as  a  determinant  of  political  orientation  and 
voting behaviour is declining in importance (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Bartle 1998; 
Nieuwbeerta  and Ultee 1999;  Hellwig 2008;  see however  Elff  2007)  or  undergoing 
major shifts (Kriesi 1998). By contrast, Freire (2006) notes that social factors contribute 
a great deal to the left-right self-placement of individuals and argues therefore that in 
previous studies „the models for social anchors were underspecified“ (Freire 2006: 371) 
in not accounting for social identities that are linked to socio-structural characteristics.
However,  while  there  may  be  a  decline  in  the  importance  of  the  industrial  class 
cleavage, there are well-founded claims that other socio-structural indicators such as 
education (Stubager 2005, 2006, 2009) have come to serve as the social divisions from 
which new cleavages emerge.
For the purpose of this study, however, socio-structural factors are of minor importance 
since  they  indicate  at  most  indirectly  the  meaning  that  is  given  to  the  left-right  
dimension in different polities.
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2.2.2. The partisan component of the left-right dimension
Contrary to the debate about social and socio-structural factors and their influence on 
the  left-right  dimension,  there  is  little  disagreement  amongst  scholars  as  to  the 
importance of the partisan component.  Parties are  not  only the main actors in most 
Western democracies, but they are manifestations of ideological conflict lines that are or 
were present in a society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).
It is therefore hardly surprising that parties are easily associated with the terms left and 
right. Throughout Europe a number of parties even bear the names left and right, such  
as  the  Norwegian  „Høyre“  (“Right”)  or  the  Danish  „Venstre“  (“Right”).  Moreover, 
indirect reference to the left-right dimension is made by the names of agrarian parties 
such as the Swedish „Centerpartiet“ (“Centre Party”) or the Finnish „Suomen Keskusta“ 
(“Finnish Centre”);  for a  brief  discussion of Scandinavian party names see Knutsen 
(2002: 32 f.).
As Inglehart and Klingemann (1976: 244) put it „party loyalties could lead members of  
the public to adopt ideological labels for themselves that are unrelated to their current 
issue positions“. We can therefore assume that the partisan component of left and right 
is  to  a  greater  degree  associated  with  the  communication  function  of  the  left-right  
dimension. Since left and right are „cues given by the political system, in particular  
political  parties,  with respect  to  political  objects“  with the „major  political  objects“  
being parties themselves (Arian and Shamir 1983: 140), it is obvious that individuals  
associate parties more easily with the left-right dimension than ideological content.
Good  empirical  evidence  for  the  link  between  party  preference  and  left-right  self-
placement is delivered by Inglehart  and Klingemann (1976: 257) who conclude that  
„one’s self location on the left-right dimension is simply often a reflection of where one  
perceives one’s favourite political party“. In ten out of eleven countries covered in their 
study  the  correlation  coefficients  between  left-right  self-placement  and  party 
identification  range  from 0,33  to  0,78,  with  only  Ireland  (0,19)  deviating  from the 
general pattern.
Further evidence comes from Knutsen (1995, 1998b) who finds that,  although value 
orientations play a bigger role than suggested by Inglehart and Klingemann’s (1976) 
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survey,  party  identification  still  outperforms  other  variables  as  an  indicator  of 
individuals’ left-right  self-placement:  „it  is  evident  that  the  partisan  component  is  
considerably larger than the value-based component“ (Knutsen 1995: 199).
A  valuable  contribution  furthering  the  understanding  of  the  link  between  party 
identification and the left-right dimension is made by Freire (2008). Applying a multi-
level approach he shows that the explanatory power of both the value and the partisan 
component  increases  with  party  polarization:  „the  higher  the  polarization  the  more 
weight that socio- economic values and partisan orientations have explaining citizens’ 
left–right self-placement“ (Freire 2008: 199).
From a comparative perspective it must of course be reckoned that parties and party 
systems constitute country-specific features that can hardly be held constant in cross-
national research. In the light of the research question of this study, it therefore seems 
apt not to include party identification as an indicator of the meaning of the left-right  
dimension and rather focus on value orientations. After all, cross-national variation in 
the dependent variable (left-right self-placement) might otherwise only reflect  cross-
national variation in the independent variable (party system).
2.2.3. The value component of the left-right dimension
Ideology  encompasses  value  orientations.  Therefore,  if  left  and  right  serve  as 
ideological  labels  within  the  political  sphere  of  mass  publics,  there  must  be  value 
orientations  associated  with  them.  Clearly,  the  ideological  concept  of  left  and  right  
would become shallow if there were no beliefs, worldviews, political programs, issue 
preferences, or simply opinions about certain policies linked to it.
After all, the meaning of left and right, as understood throughout this work, is given to  
the terms by beliefs that (groups of) individuals are more or less likely to hold when  
describing themselves as being more to the left or to the right. 
Societal cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) are one major source of value orientations 
being incorporated into the left-right dimension. For the purpose of this study, however, 
it is of minor importance if the cleavages represented by the left-right continuum are of  
a more interest-based or ideological kind. Indeed, hardly any social division that can be 
empirically traced is constituted purely of one or the other type. 
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While a cleavage in the narrow sense of the word encompasses a socio-structural, an 
organizational, and an ideological component (Bartolini and Mair 1990), it is obvious 
that  value  orientations  that  correlate  with  left-right  self-identification  need  not 
necessarily stem from the presence of all three elements of a cleavage. This is especially  
true when considering the erosion of the social basis of the class cleavage due to major 
changes  taking  place  in  Western  societies  during  the  post-war  era.  Inglehart  and 
Flanagan (1987: 1296) therefore argue that the late twentieth century is witnessing a  
development „from class-based to value based political polarization“.
The  implications  of  this  development  for  the  research  question  presented  here  are 
crucial. If enduring economic prosperity and social peace as well as significant changes 
in the social structure of the labour force drive the decline in importance of the class 
cleavage in industrial societies and hence render more salient a new set of values and 
beliefs, there is good reason to assume that the degree to which this shift is taking place 
depends on the amount of economic prosperity and social stability that has been present  
in a country.
Presupposing  that  new  value  orientations  and  policy  issues  –  be  they  labelled 
postmaterialist,  New Politics,  libertarian-authoritarian,  or  GAL/TAN (see  below for 
further explanation) – are at least partially incorporated into the semantics of left and 
right (an assumption that is supported by inter alia Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, and 
Knutsen 1995), it can further be conjectured that such a shift in the individual beliefs 
associated with the terms left and right is more likely to take place in highly developed 
and prosperous societies. Eventually, this process may lead to cross-national variation in  
the meaning of left and right.
2.3. The meaning of the left-right dimension
The  following  section  first  reviews  the  specific  meaning  given  to  the  left-right 
dimension. First, a historical overview sketches the development of these terms from 
late eighteenth century France to the establishment of mass democracy in large parts of 
Europe around 1900. Second, I identify three value cleavages which, in accord with 
previous research (Knutsen 1995, 2002; Freire 2006, 2008; Middendorp 1992), can be 
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supposed to determine individuals’ left-right orientation: religious, socio-economic, and 
libertarian-authoritarian values and beliefs.
Third, four conceptual approaches to the changing meaning of the left-right dimension  
are discussed (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990): irrelevance, persistence, transformation 
and pluralisation theory. The fact that the findings of Kitschelt and Hellemans (1990) as  
well as Knutsen (1995) are in support for the latter approach adds to the relevance of the  
research issue at stake.
Finally, a short subsection is devoted to the question of the causal relationship between 
value orientations and left-right self-identification. Following Middendorp (1992: 250) 
it is argued that the former causes the latter and not the other way round.
2.3.1. From the French Revolution to mass democracy
In what follows the historical development of the terms left and right is outlined from 
their  first  use  as  political  labels  in  the  wake  of  the  French  Revolution  until  their 
establishment  as  expressions  of  the  industrial  cleavage  and  their  subsequent 
transformation during the twentieth century. The account given here largely reflects the 
findings of Laponce (1981: 47 ff.) and Eatwell (1989).
During the late spring of 1789 the French Estates General – comprising the clergy, the 
nobility  and the commons – assembled for  a  discussion of  a  new constitution.  The 
monarch, Louis XVI, together with his ministers presided the opening session of the so 
called  National  Assembly.  A brief  account  of  the  seating  arrangements  is  given  by 
Laponce (1981: 47):
The king sat on a throne raised on the highest platform. […] The clergy was on the right side, the nobility 
on the left. The Third Estate, further removed from the king’s throne than either nobles or clergy, was 
linked to the two privileged orders. An up/down, close/far, and right/left space determined the order of  
preference: the higher, the closer to the king and the more clearly to his right, the greater the distinction.
The hierarchical order that was manifest in this spatial disposition was soon challenged 
by the commoners. The decision about the voting procedure proofed to be a critical 
event  in  the  course  of  these  gatherings.  While  the  members  of  the  clergy  and  the 
nobility clearly favoured a procedure that would give each of the three Estates the same 
weight, the commoners argued for a one man one vote system.
18
This conflict  lead the Third Estate to revolt  against  the orders of the king who had 
before  put  the  gatherings  of  the  assembly  on  hold.  However,  even  without  Royal 
consent, the commoners congregated on their own and „proclaimed themselves to be a 
National Assembly“ (Laponce 1981: 47). However, they did not fail to invite the other  
two Estates  to  join  them –  an  offer  that  was  first  only  accepted  by  the  clergy  but 
eventually by all members of the nobility as well. With the first clergymen to arrive in  
the  self-proclaimed National  Assembly,  the  spatial  ordering  was  determined for  the  
future of the legislature:
The president answered: The deputies of the estate of the clergy at the Estates General shall be received  
with all the courteousness and respect owed to them. Their usual seats from the previous assembly are  
free to receive them. […] The members of the clergy sat down in their seats to the right of the president 
(Mavidal, Laurent and Clavel 1875: 141; translation by the author).
The outcome of these events was crucial: the members of the new assembly were no 
longer meant to represent their Estate but were expected to act as representatives of the  
French nation as  a  whole.  The hierarchical  seating arrangements  that  structured the  
assembly in the beginning were replaced by two groups opposing each other: „most of 
the nobility and clergy could be seen to take up positions on the right, whereas the Third  
Estate […] occupied the left (Eatwell 1989: 33).
Surely,  the first  gatherings of  this  new National  Assembly in  1789 must  have been 
somewhat disorganized and chaotic, but only two years later – after a renewal of the 
legislature through the voters – the picture had become much clearer:
The attention of the whole of France is now directed at the new legislature. Yet the tempers of the French 
are divided into three parties. One part, usually called the aristocrat party whose followers took the right 
side in the previous National Assembly, is disapproving of the whole constitution and even partly allowed 
itself to protest against it; another part, and that is the party which in the end gained the upper hand in the 
National Assembly and made the constitution, is called the moderate or the monarchic [party], because it 
sought to reconcile the virtues of monarchic government and the reputation of the constituted Royal  
decency with the rights and freedom of the people; opposed to this party is the demagogic or republican 
[party] which for a long time dominated the National Assembly and, had its system got through, would 
have eternalized anarchy. (Wiener Zeitung, October 19, 1791, translation by the author)
The identification of the aristocrats with the right side of the assembly had become 
more than a spatial reference – it had obtained a pejorative connotation:
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During this discussion, Mr. La Croix said that some members from the right side wished to speak: this 
description which called to mind the right side of the previous assembly, was received by the whole  
chamber with such great objection that Mr. La Croix could only evade the penalty of being arrested 
through an excuse and a declaration that he was far from comparing the members sitting on the right side  
with the  right  side  of  the  previous assembly.  (Wiener  Zeitung,  October  19,  1791;  translation by the 
author)
Within a surprisingly short – but admittedly eventful – period of time, the terms of left  
and right had, in addition to their literal meaning, acquired political connotations that  
would  continuously  be  used  in  describing  political  conflict  in  France  and  other 
European countries of the nineteenth century.
However, from the citations above it becomes clear that the first conflict to be expressed 
by the left-right labels was about the role of the French monarchy and the adoption of a 
new  constitution  in.  At  later  stages,  other  cleavages,  such  as  the  religious-secular 
featured more prominently under these labels.
Interestingly, the economic policies advocated by the left and the right during the pre-
industrial  era  were the sheer opposites of what  is  deemed to be their  contemporary 
economic  meaning:  „In  economic  terms,  the  right  defended  feudal  relations,  and 
government monopolies. The left tended more to defend the free market […]“ (Eatwell 
1989: 34). Also, Laponce (1981: 118) holds that at that time „the left was individualistic 
and opposed to group property. It was opposed to economic regulations […]“.
Given the parliamentary environment in which the left-right semantics were established 
as a political vocabulary it is hardly surprising that the relevance of the terms varied 
with the absence or presence of parliamentary rule throughout the nineteenth century. 
Also, the parliamentary systems of England and the United States, which had been in 
place prior to the French Revolution and therefore had brought about their own labels 
for political  groups,  adopted the left-right terminology to a much lesser extent.  The  
United  States  until  today  retain  the  terms  liberal  and  conservative  as  functional 
equivalents of left and right (see e. g. Conover and Feldman 1981).
Against this background it appears logical that the industrial class cleavage would only 
be incorporated into the left-right schema once suffrage was extended to the working 
class so that socialist parties could enter the parliamentary arena and thus change the 
political  competition  all  across  Europe.  Again,  this  change  took  place  neither  
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simultaneously nor to the same extent in all democratic political systems. As Eatwell  
(1989: 34) notes „the Dreyfuss Affair in the 1890s was an especially important factor in  
holding back class differences“ in France.
When in the wake of the Industrial Revolution the rise of the workers’ movement gave 
birth to the – initially extra-parliamentary – socialist parties, the introduction of mass  
suffrage established a new conflict line within legislatures. While still at odds with each  
other on many issues, the old parties suddenly found themselves on the same side of the 
predominant class division.  In some countries this  led to stronger cooperation,  even 
merging of the right-wing parties. In others, most notably in the United Kingdom, the 
rise of the socialist parties resulted in the decline of one major party of the right.
While  the left  of  the French Revolution and the socialist  left  of  the late  nineteenth 
century differed on a lot of issues, they shared a belief in the necessity of revolutionary 
change.  However,  as  socialist  parties  gained  more  and  more  seats  in  national 
parliaments, they were forced to opt either for cooperation with the bourgeois parties or 
to remain isolated in the political process: „The choice of either alternative was at first 
described under a great variety of contrasting labels […] but increasingly the choice 
appeared as choice between left and right“ (Laponce 1981: 55).
The socialist  and communist  movements helped to spread the left-right  terminology 
from Western Europe to Russia, China and even the United States. Quite a number of 
socialist or communist parties officially called themselves left or parties.
Within a few decades the political objects labelled left or right and the ideological views  
associated with those terms had markedly changed. The confusion as to the meaning of 
left and right was even expanded by the ascription of the left-right terminology to the  
fascist and communist regimes that formed during the first half of the twentieth century. 
A left-right ordering of ideologies or regimes therefore usually takes the following form 
(see Eatwell 1989: 42):
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Communism        Socialism        Liberalism        Conservatism        Fascism
There  are,  however,  several  problems  with  such  a  unidimensional  approach. 
Considering,  for  instance,  the role  of  economic issues,  it  can hardly be argued that 
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fascist regimes were non-interventionist proponents of the free market. What is more, 
the extent of government propaganda, mass activism and the totalitarian state that were 
present under communist as well as fascist rule suggest that the extremes of this scale 
may have more in common than indicated by this specific ordering. The major flaw of 
this left-right sequence, however, is the insufficient differentiation between ideologies 
(such as liberalism) and concrete political regimes (such as fascism).
Regardless  of  the  lack  of  clarity  in  such  ascriptions,  the  twentieth  century,  and 
especially the period of the Cold War, shaped the terms left and right as labels for the  
opposing sides of the industrial class conflict. Only in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century the class cleavage lines have been supplemented by other societal divisions. 
Inglehart  (1977:  183)  argues that  long-time experiences of  economic prosperity  and 
stability will render quality-of-life issues more important at the expense of economic 
issues:
In an increasingly Post-Materialist society one might expect the most salient political questions to shift 
from economic to life-style issues; along with this would come a change in the political meaning of Left  
and Right, and we might also anticipate a fundamental shift in the social bases of political partisanship.
Although  there  may  be  many  legitimate  criticisms  of  Inglehart’s  post-materialism 
hypothesis,  there  are  good  reasons  to  believe  that  non-economic  issues  have 
increasingly shaped political competition during the past three decades and therefore  
also  affected  the  meaning  of  left  and  right.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Western  Europe 
experienced the rise of a new party family that has been given labels such as „New 
Right“,  „extreme  right“,  „radical  right“,  „right-wing  populist“  or  the  like  (for  an 
analysis of the conceptual confusion see Mudde 1996). While there is little scholarly 
agreement as to the classification of these parties, it can be viewed as certain that they  
did not win their share of the vote on a platform of economic policies.
Similarly, the environmental or green parties that entered a number of West European  
legislatures during the 1980s are on the left in that “they oppose the market place and  
insist on solidarity and equality” (Kitschelt 1988: 197). However, these parties have at 
the heart of their ideology issues that are non-material: environmentalism, feminism, 
self-governance, pacifism, and the like.
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With  new  parties  running  on  non-economic  issues  on  either  side  of  the  left-right 
spectrum, the structure of political competition is likely to be altered. The dominance in  
determining left and right of the socio-economic issues related to the class cleavage is 
becoming at  least  relatively  weaker  with  new issues  and lines  of  conflict  featuring 
prominently on the political agenda of European democracies in the last two decades of 
the twentieth century (see Kitschelt 1988).
2.3.3. Cleavages: religious, socio-economic, and libertarian-authoritarian values
Given that the terms left and right have been used to capture major ideological conflicts  
during the past 200 years in Europe, it is likely that their meaning today reflects the  
historical  development  of  cleavages  throughout  the  continent.  I  therefore  choose  to 
examine the influence of three sets of value orientations that correspond to historical 
periods.
The religious-secular cleavage in the eyes of Knutsen (1995: 66) is „the central conflict  
line emerging from pre-industrial society“. Also, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) consider it  
the  most  important  cleavage  previous  to  the  processes  of  industrialization that  took 
place all over Europe. The trigger events that brought to the fore these deep divisions 
within numerous European societies were National Revolutions (such as the French) 
which challenged the Churches’ authority over many realms of public life, from health  
care and civil law to education and science.
The  fierceness  of  this  conflict  was  much  more  outspoken  in  societies  with  an 
overwhelmingly  Catholic  or  mixed  belief  populace  than  in  countries  with  a  clear  
dominance  of  Protestant  followers.  As  confessions  in  the  latter  were  organized  as 
national  churches,  the shared national  identity  could serve as a  common ground on 
which  to  compromise  about  the  role  of  the  church  within  the  nation  state.  Such 
reconciliation was impeded in non- or only partially Protestant societies by the fact that  
a large part of the population at least implicitly questioned the authority of the national  
leaders by remaining loyal to a different, less profane but still political, authority: the 
pope in Rome. 
Today, the still  remarkable number (and size) of Christian-democratic and Christian-
social parties present in Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century can serve as 
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a rough indicator for the persistence of the religious cleavage. Taking a closer look, 
Lijphart holds that, while “a decline of ideology has occurred” (1990: 259), the religious 
dimension is still the second most significant in Western Europe.
Religious  people  across  European  countries  tend  “to  favour  values  that  promote 
conservation of social and individual order” (Saroglou / Delpierre and Dernelle 2004). 
From this insight, we can expect individuals with strong religious ties to be more to the  
right than people are on average. Similar conclusions can be drawn from Laponce’s 
(1970, 1972, 1981) findings which suggest that religious terms and symbols are clearly 
connected  to  the  right  pole  of  the  left-right  schema.  Likewise,  Middendorp  (1992), 
Knutsen (1995), and Freire (2006, 2008) deliver empirical proof for the relevance of 
religious beliefs as to the meaning of the left-right dimension.
On these grounds, religious value orientations are included in the present study as one 
of three sets of determinants of left-right self-identification. Given the varying shares of 
non-believers and the diverse confessional composition of European countries (Cipriani 
2009), we can expect to find considerable variation in the strength of the religious value 
component.
While  the societal  developments  driving the establishment  of  the religious  cleavage 
differed widely across countries, the upheavals of the Industrial Revolution that gave 
birth to the socio-economic cleavage were much more uniform. Therefore, Lipset and 
Rokkan  (1967)  hold  that  the  class  cleavage  accounts  for  variations  in  the  conflict 
structure within but not among countries.
Two crucial preconditions for the socio-economic cleavage to come into effect were the 
rise of parliamentary rule in Europe during the nineteenth century and the extension of 
the suffrage to encompass all (male) citizens within a polity. This is not to say that the 
ideology of the left was always in line with democratic norms:
„When mass  democracy replaced bourgeois  democracy,  the left  changed character.  Its  emphasis  was 
increasingly on equality rather than on liberty, even if this required the use of authoritarian government  
and the abandonment of parliamentary democracy“ (Laponce 1981: 118).
Still, the majority of European countries at that time did not experience revolutionary 
change successfully  enforced by Socialist  or  Communist  Parties.  Instead,  the socio-
economic conflicts of the industrial era became the major cleavage to be present within 
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the  political  systems  of  Europe.  As  Knutsen  (1995:  65)  puts  it,  the  „key  issues 
underlying the Left-Right  polarization was the conflict  over ownership of means of 
production and the distribution of income“. Hence, it is obvious that this division was  
and still is existent in most areas of social and economic policy-making. It encompasses 
a great number of specific policy issues such as public versus private property, state 
ownership versus privatization of firms, government intervention in the economy versus 
free  enterprise,  collective  social  responsibility  versus  individual  rights  and  duties, 
higher versus lower tax rates, increasing versus decreasing public services, expansion 
versus cutback of the welfare  state,  government-steered redistribution versus market  
allocation of income, and the like.
Some indication for the importance of the socio-economic dimension is delivered by 
one of the most ambitious research projects in the discipline of political science: The  
Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2006), uses twenty-six policy categories 
found in election manifestos to estimate the left-right position of political parties. Of  
these twenty-six items, twelve refer to socio-economic policies.
Anthony Downs, in his seminal work An Economic Theory of Democracy, outlines his 
spatial model of party competition along a single dimension where „the left end of the 
scale represents full government control [of the economy], and the right end means a 
completely free market“ (Downs 1957: 116). Thus, in the Downsian model, the left-
right position of a voter becomes the sole determinant of his or her vote.
Throughout the twentieth century (with the exception of fascist rule during the 1930s 
and  1940s),  the  socio-economic  dimension  of  left  and  right  dominated  political 
competition in most of Western Europe. Also, the structure of party systems throughout 
Western Europe reflects the persistence at  least  of the organizational element of the 
class cleavage (Lijphart 1990).
Taking all these arguments into consideration, it is likely that the value component of 
the  class  cleavage  remains  highly  salient  even  if  the  ongoing  transformation  of 
European societies from an industrial to a post-industrial stage and the emergence of a 
broad middle class erode the social divisions at the base of the class cleavage. Empirical 
evidence for the continued relevance of socio-economic value orientations is presented 
by Knutsen (1995, 1997) and Kitschelt and Hellemans (1990).
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However, starting with the works of Ronald Inglehart (most notably 1977) there has 
been growing scholarly attention to the emergence of a new political conflict line in 
Western societies. Confusingly, this cleavage has been given different names such as 
materialist-postmaterialist  (e.  g.  Inglehart  1977;  Middendorp  1992),  New  Politics 
(Kitschelt  and  Hellemans  1990;  Rohrschneider  1993),  libertarian-authoritarian  (e.  g. 
Evans  /  Heath  and  Lalljee  1996;  Flanagan  and  Lee  2003),  GAL-TAN  (short  for 
green/alternative/libertarianism-traditionalism/authority/nationalism,  e.  g.  Marks et  al.  
2006), or simply „cultural dimension“ (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). 
The variety of labels used can be taken as an indicator of the variety of issues that have 
been associated with this dimension: environmentalism, quality of life, anti-immigration 
sentiment,  strengthening  of  participatory  democracy,  support  for  authoritarian  ideas,  
permissive policies on homosexuals and abortion, gender equality, nationalism, support 
for upholding traditions and customs, and so forth.
Although  these  topics  at  first  glance  seem  quite  unrelated,  they  share  a  common 
principle in that they are no typical bread and butter issues and therefore only become 
salient  once socio-economic issues have been settled to  some extent:  „[A]s scarcity 
diminishes, other factors shape society to an increasing degree“ (Inglehart and Flanagan 
1987: 1289).
According to Kitschelt these new issues „conform neither to traditional conservative nor 
to socialist programs (1988: 195). By cutting across traditional cleavages they amount  
to a policy platform that has given rise to new parties on the left (Kitschelt 1988) as well 
as on the right (Kitschelt 1995) of the political spectrum.
Whereas the commonalities of these values and beliefs are not necessarily self-evident,  
it can be argued that some of these issues are clearly related in that they draw on the  
dichotomy of equality versus hierarchy that is one of the “stable elements” of the left-
right dimension (Laponce 1981: 135). While socio-economic values refer to (in)equality 
in  a  more  materialistic  sense,  authoritarian-libertarian  values  often  relate  to  the 
(in)equality  of  genders,  different  sexual  orientations,  races  or  ethnicities,  religious 
beliefs, and the like.
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2.3.4. Four theories about the changing meaning of the left-right dimension
The wide range of social and ideological conflicts, value orientations, and policy issues  
discussed so far indicates that the meaning of the left-right semantics has been subject 
to  a  process  of  permanent  alteration  throughout  the  past  200  years.  To  assess  the 
dynamics  of  the  changing  meaning  of  the  left-right  dimension  more  profoundly, 
Kitschelt  and Hellemans (1990) outline four theoretical  approaches dealing with the 
change  of  values  linked  to  the  terms  left  and  right:  transformation,  irrelevance, 
persistence,  and  pluralisation  theory  (for  a  more  systematic  overview  see  Knutsen 
1995).
Transformation theory largely reflects Ronald Inglehart’s (1984) assumptions about the 
changing nature of political conflict structures in Western societies. Accordingly, the 
relatively long period of economic stability and political security that Western countries 
experienced after the Second World War has resulted in new political wants and needs 
becoming salient. These new issues (post-materialist as Inglehart calls them) are then 
incorporated into the ideological repertoire of the left. Thus, the predominantly socio-
economic  left-right  dimension  is  transformed  into  a  postmaterialist  (left)  versus 
materialist (right) dimension. Consequently, the socio-economic cleavage is gradually 
replaced by  the materialist versus post-materialist conflict. However, Knutsen (1995) 
reminds us not to overlook the fact that the socio-economic (or materialist) meaning of  
left  and  right  is  a  product  of  the  Industrial  Revolution.  Hence,  the  conflict  lines 
associated with the left-right divide prior to the Industrial Revolution have to be taken 
into  the  equation.  Accordingly,  transformation  theory  implies  that  the  left-right  
dimension  has  changed  its  meaning  from secular-religious  to  socialist-bourgeois  to 
postmaterialist-materialist.
Irrelevance theory, on the contrary, draws on the end-of-ideology thesis which was put 
forward, inter alia by Bell (1960). Not only do individuals (Knutsen 1998a; Freire 2007) 
and political parties (Knutsen 1998c) exhibit tendencies of convergence to the centre, 
but the left-right dimension itself becomes less relevant to mass publics because of its 
strong association with the declining cleavage of the industrial age: it “cannot shed its 
economic connotations” (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990: 214). Therefore, the terms left  
and right “are making less and less sence [sic!] to the electorate” (Knutsen 1995: 66).
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Persistence theory counters these arguments and states that the left-right dimension not 
only remains meaningful but also gradually incorporates non-economic issues. While 
these new (post-materialist) issues may not be as coherent as socio-economic attitudes 
and do not replace them in any way, they are closely linked to the conflict issues of the 
traditional  class  cleavage  according  to  persistence  theory.  „There  is  no  trade-off  
between  economic  and  noneconomic  views  of  left  and  right“,  as  Kitschelt  and 
Hellemans  (1990:  214)  argue.  However,  such  a  strong  link  between  leftism  and 
libertarian  values  as  well  as  rightism  and  authoritarian  beliefs  is  empirically 
questionable. On the party system level, for instance, Marks et al. (2006) find that a  
pattern oft left-libertarian vs. right-authoritarian conflict can be detected among Western 
European parties, but that the alignment is reversed in Eastern Europe: „[T]he structure 
we do find yields an axis of party competition at a 90 degree angle to that in the West“ 
(Marks et al. 2006: 158). The left-authoritarian versus right-libertarian structure of party 
competition in the East, possibly a result of the communist past, is at odds with the  
implications of persistence theory.
Pluralization  theory attempts  to  reconcile  the  transformation  and  persistence 
approaches. It argues that the socio-economic views remain an important determinant of 
left-right self-identification, but that new sets of values provide additional meaning to 
the terms left and right. Contrary to transformation theory, pluralization theory holds  
that  socio-economic  values  are  not  replaced  by  New Politics  issues.  The  normative 
content of the class cleavage continues to be salient but is not as strictly correlated with 
libertarian-authoritarian  values  as  suggested  by  persistence  theory.  The  findings 
presented by Kitschelt and Hellemans (1990) as well as Knutsen (1995) are strongly in 
support for pluralization theory. As a matter of fact, the historical development of the 
left-right dimension as outlined above implicitly corroborates pluralization theory since 
it suggests that „left-right distinction is an over-arching spatial dimension which tends 
to incorporate many types of conflicts“ (Knutsen 1995: 68).
If we accept the reasoning of pluralization theory, the relevance of the research question 
becomes even more obvious. Since we cannot expect the relationships amongst different 
dimensions of the left-right schema to be overly straightforward, the country-specific 
weight of each dimension deserves serious attention.
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2.3.5. The causal relationship between values and the left-right dimension
Following Middendorp (1992), a brief discussion about the causal relationship between 
individuals’ value  orientations  and left-right  self-placement  is  included.  Middendorp 
(1992: 250) asks:
„Is left-right self-identification the expression of values and ideological orientations behind them or is it  
the source from which these values and ideological orientations spring? […] [T]he latter position seems 
theoretically less plausible than the former one, since in the latter case we have to assume that complex 
value  orientations  and  ideological  stands  are  somehow  'caused'  by  subjective  self-placement  on  an  
imaginary continuum“ (italics in the original).
Throughout this study and in accordance with Middendorp, the causal direction between 
value orientations and left-right self-identification is assumed to run from the former to 
the latter. The left-right dimension is conceived of as a semantic container that holds 
different  sets  of  ideological  content  corresponding  to  the  political  conflicts  present 
during a given period in time.
Therefore, the specific values, beliefs, and attitudes held by individuals determine their  
self-placement  along the  left-right  continuum rather  than  the  other  way round (see, 
however, Neundorf 2009: 203 f.). This causal relationship is prone to the influence of 
intervening variables that render the likelihood of specific value orientations to affect  
left-right  self-identification  higher  or  lower.  However,  an  in-depth  analysis  of  these 
intervening variables (such as socio-structural factors or party system features) which 
eventually establish a certain meaning of the left-right dimension within a given polity  
is beyond the scope of the analysis to be conducted here.
Even so, some indication as to the nature of these intervening variables may be given by  
the similarities and differences in the meaning of left and right amongst the 21 countries 
included in this study. Moreover, the hypotheses that will be drawn up in the following 
section and empirically tested thereafter refer to some of the intervening variables that 
may to a certain degree explain the cross-national variation in the significance and value  
content of the left-right dimension.
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3. HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND METHODS
3.1. Six hypotheses about cross-national similarities and differences
A number of assumptions will be used to further specify the research question and thus 
guide  the  analysis.  Therefore,  all  hypotheses  presented  here  pertain  to  the  task  of 
highlighting  similarities  and  differences  in  the  meaning  of  the  left-right  dimension 
across Europe. However, as this study constitutes a somewhat exploratory task, mere 
verification or falsification of the hypotheses will not result in the research endeavour 
being considered as exhaustively pursued. Still, the following assumptions are deemed  
useful in that they serve as a means of efficient structuring of the present study.
The first  set  of hypotheses concerns the salience of the religious-secular dimension. 
Drawing on cleavage theory we can assume that the importance of this conflict line 
varies with the presence of certain religious denominations in a given country. Lipset  
and Rokkan (1990: 102) state that „[i]n the religiously mixed countries and in purely 
Catholic ones […] the ideas of the French Revolution proved highly divisive“. Since 
Protestant societies had during the age of the reformation emancipated themselves from 
Rome, the thrust of the National Revolutions did not conflict with the interests of the 
national  churches  in  the  northern  parts  of  Europe.  Therefore,  as  Marks  and Wilson 
(2000: 438) put it, “[r]eligious practice is generally a much weaker source of political  
competition in Protestant countries”. Similar things can be asserted for the Orthodox 
countries in Eastern Europe.  The Orthodox churches are not centrally organized but 
have national branches such as the Russian, the Serbian, or the Bulgarian Patriarchate – 
all  of  which  were  already  established  during  the  Middle  Ages.  Therefore,  conflict 
between religious and political leaders during the time of nation-building was much less 
likely. 
On the basis of these premises, the first hypothesis can be developed:
H1 The religious dimension of the left-right schema is more salient in predominantly  
Catholic societies than in predominantly Protestant or Orthodox ones.
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The National Revolutions which challenged the authority of the churches date back to 
the eighteenth or nineteenth century. Since then, a process of secularization has been 
going  on  in  most  European  countries,  by  which  „economic  development  and 
modernization lead to a move from traditional-religious towards secular-rational values“ 
(Saroglou / Delpierre and Dernelle 2004: 731). However, it is less clear whether and 
how  secularization  trends  impact  on  the  political  systems  of  Europe.  While  some 
authors (Dogan 1995; Dalton 1996) argue that the religious cleavage is on the decline,  
others (Elff 2007; Brooks / Nieuwbeerta and Manza 2006: 109) find no unambiguous 
proof  for  such  a  conjecture.  Still,  from  the  latter  study  it  becomes  clear  that  the 
importance of  the religious  cleavage varies  significantly  across  countries.  Assuming 
also that processes of secularization vary in pace and scope, there are consequences to 
be expected for the relation between the importance of religion in a country and its role  
in explaining left-right orientations. Against this background, hypothesis number two 
can be formulated:
H2 The saliency of religious values in determining self-placement on the left  or 
right corresponds to the overall importance of religion in a country.
A second set of assumptions deals with the relation of socio-economic values and the 
left-right dimension. As suggested by a number of scholars (e. g. Lipset et al. 1954; 
Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Fuchs and Klingemann 1989; 
Knutsen 1995), socio-economic conflicts are at the heart of political competition during 
the  industrial  era  and  therefore  constitute  the  dominant  ideological  struggle  of  the 
twentieth century. Moreover, whereas other conflict lines are not necessarily present in 
all countries, the class cleavage structures the party system in all West European polities 
(Lijphart 1990). We can therefore expect socio-economic value orientations to be the 
most powerful predictors of left-right self-placement in this study:
H3 Of  all  value  orientations  those  associated  with  the  class  cleavage  have  the 
greatest explanatory power concerning left-right self-identification in Europe.
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However,  as  a  consequence  of  communist  rule  in  the  Soviet  sphere  of  influence, 
political competition was inexistent in large parts of Europe during the decades after  
World War II. Hence, we cannot expect the formation of a socio-economic cleavage to 
proceed as straightforward as in Western Europe but to be constrained by a number of  
intervening factors, such as ethnic conflict, state-building, and the respective pattern of 
transition to democratic rule (Evans and Whitefield 1993; Whitefield 2002). Moreover, 
it must be recalled that the emergence of the class cleavage was made possible only 
through  the  introduction  of  (male)  mass  suffrage  around  the  turn  of  the  twentieth 
century.  With  electorates  deprived  of  these  rights  under  communist  rule,  the  socio-
economic  conflict  that  at  the  same  time  dominated  the  political  arenas  of  Western 
Europe was suppressed by a monolithic and non-competitive political environment.
If  the  emergence  of  a  socio-economic  divide  is  prone  to  such  disturbances,  the 
traditional class cleavage values can be presumed to have less effect in determining the 
left-right dimension:
H4 While running in the same direction, the link between socio-economic values 
and  left-right  self-placement  is  weaker  in  former  communist  societies  than 
elsewhere in Europe.
As to  the  libertarian-authoritarian  dimension,  there  is  good  reason  (Inglehart  1977; 
Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Calista 1984) to assume that such issues become salient 
only when economic wants and needs are  sufficiently satisfied.  At  the heart  of this  
argument lies Maslow’s theory about the hierarchy of human needs, which holds that 
„when  a  need  is  fairly  well  satisfied,  the  next  prepotent  ('higher')  need  emerges“ 
(Maslow  1943:  395).  Inglehart’s  (1977)  theory  about  value  change  in  advanced 
industrial societies transfers this axiom from the individual to the societal level. Given 
the predominantly  non-materialist  values associated with the libertarian-authoritarian 
dimension, we can therefore conjecture:
H5 The more economically developed a country, the more powerful the libertarian-
authoritarian dimension in explaining left-right self-identification.
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As  was  mentioned  above,  Marks  et  al.  (2006)  found  at  the  party  system  level  a 
relationship between economic left-right and libertarian-authoritarian policy positions 
that differed markedly between Eastern and Western Europe. This is partly due to the 
fact that Soviet-style communism combined the strive for socio-economic equality with 
authoritarian rule, thus possibly encouraging at the individual level the association of 
market  liberalism  and  libertarian  views.  Since  the  terms  left  and  right  have  been 
predominantly associated with socio-economic issues throughout the twentieth century, 
it can be assumed that the link between libertarian-authoritarian values and left-right 
self-identification runs in opposite directions in Eastern and Western Europe.
H6 Libertarian-authoritarian values in Eastern Europe are related to the left-right 
dimension in the reverse direction when compared with Western Europe.
Once these six hypotheses are empirically tested, the broader picture of similarities and 
differences in the meaning of the left-right dimension in European societies will emerge. 
Thus, the final goal of the research task – grouping countries according to their left-right  
value profile – will be considerably easier to attain.
3.2. Operationalizing the research question
3.2.1. Three dimensions of value orientations
The choice of items to measure the impact of different value orientations on individuals’  
left-right placement is of critical importance to answering the research question. The 
English  questionnaire  of  the  European  Social  Survey’s  Round  4  (European  Social  
Survey Round 4 Data 2008) offers a number of possible questions to operationalize the 
three relevant dimensions of value orientations. In all cases, it has been attempted to 
identify survey items that fulfill two criteria: (1) the items for each dimension ought to 
display a certain degree of congruence, that is, they must be closer to each other than to 
those of the other two dimensions; (2) however, there should not be too great an amount 
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of  redundancy  among  the  items  belonging  to  one  dimension.  Since  the  notions  of 
congruence  and non-redundancy are  obviously  at  odds  with  one  another,  it  will  be 
discussed here to what extent these criteria are met by the selected items.
Table 1: Selected questions for three dimensions of value orientations




Regardless of whether you belong to a particular 
religion, how religious would you say you are? 
0 not religious at all
10 very religious
Attendance*
Apart from special occasions such as weddings 




3 only on special holy days
4 at least once a month
5 once a week
6 more than once a week
7 every day
Praying
Apart from when you are at religious services, 




3 only on special holy days
4 at least once a month
5 once a week





The government should take measures to reduce 
differences in income levels.
1 agree strongly
2 agree




Large differences in people’s incomes are 








Many social benefits and services are paid for by 
taxes. If the government had to choose between 
increasing taxes and spending more on social 
benefits and services, or decreasing taxes and 
spending less on social benefits and services, 
which should they do? Choose your answer from 
this card. 
0 Government should increase 
taxes a lot and spend much more 
on social benefits and services. 
10 Government should decrease 
taxes a lot and spend much less 




Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their 
own life as they wish.
1 agree strongly
2 agree




Is [country] made a worse or a better place to 
live by people coming to live here from other 
countries?
0 better place to live
10 worse place to live
Obedience* Schools must teach children to obey authority. 
1 disagree strongly
2 disagree
3 neither agree nor disagree
4 agree
5 agree strongly
Note: Scales for items marked with an asterisk (*) have been reversed so that the “expected” correlation with  respondents’ left-
right self-placement will be positive. Negative coefficients will therefore indicate counter-intuitive associations.
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As to religious-secular views of the respondents,  three questions have been chosen, 
which pertain to (1) a person’s religiosity, (2) a person’s public religious practice, that  
is, church attendance., and (3) the frequency at which a person prays. While all three 
questions  (for  exact  wordings  see  table  1)  are  clearly  connected  to  each  other  and  
therefore sufficiently congruent,  this item set  also exhibits a relatively high level of 
redundancy, as can be seen from the high correlation coefficients (up to 0.75 in some 
cases)  between  the  three  questions.  However,  it  can  be  revealed  here  that 
multicollinearity  for  the  religious-secular  items  is  only  low  to  moderate  in  the 
subsequent linear regression analysis. Moreover, the explanatory power of each item 
varies considerably from country to country.
The  socio-economic  dimension  will  be  captured  by  questions  concerning  attitudes 
towards (1)  government efforts to reduce income inequality, (2) the justness of income  
differences reflecting varying talents and efforts, and (3) the level of taxes and public  
services. Clearly, these three items relate to the role of the state in the economic realm  
and to the principles of market economy, both of which are at the core of the socio-
economic  conflict.  However,  despite  the  fact  that  the  first  two  questions  are  both 
concerned with income equality and even provide respondents with the same answering 
scale,  the  maximum correlation  found  amongst  these  items  is  0.42  in  one  country. 
Therefore,  the  socio-economic  items  are  arguably  the  most  well-balanced  between 
sufficient congruence and little redundancy.
With all country-wise correlations below 0.3, there is evidently little overlap between 
the  libertarian-authoritarian  items.  However,  since  the  issues  of  (1)  freedom  for 
homosexuals to  live according to  their  wishes,  (2)  immigration making a  country a 
better or worse place to live, and (3) the importance of obeying to authority, are only  
loosely related to each other, the degree of congruence is rather modest. Still, all three 
questions are concerned with a notion of hierarchy and societal order in one way or the  
other.
The nine items shown in table 1 will in a first step serve as independent variables in a  
linear regression model. The dependent variable will be the question about individuals’ 
self-placement on a eleven-point left-right axis. The exact wording is:
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In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Using this card, where would  
you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?
As implied by the rescaling of some of the independent variables (see note in table 1),  
the  expected  finding  is  that  the  more  secular,  pro-government-intervention,  and 
libertarian  the  views  of  a  respondent  the  more  to  the  left  she  places  herself.  The  
standardized coefficients yielded from the country-wise linear regression analysis will  
serve as new variables in a cluster analysis procedure to group countries according to 
the strengths of the single items. The statistical procedures are described more precisely  
in the following section.
3.2.2. An outline of the statistical model
All regression analyses are conducted separately for each country. In a first step, the 
regressions  are  carried  out  for  each  value  dimension.  These  regressions  take  the 
following form:
y = b0 + x1b1 + x2b2 + x3b3 + ε
The final regression model introduces each of the three sets of variables, so that the  
effect of each dimension’s items can be compared between the three-item and the full 
models.  From the  changes  in  significance  or  direction  of  the  regression  estimators 
inferences can be drawn about the interrelations between the three value dimensions.  
The full encompassing all nine variables will then also serve as the basis for the final 
cluster analysis. However, in order to weight the effects of all nine items equally when 
clustering, standardized regression coefficients are used for this purpose. Otherwise the 
estimators of variables with more limited answering scales would receive more weight  
in the creation of the distance matrix that provides the starting point for clustering.
Cluster analysis requires two critical decisions to be made: one between measures of 
distance or similarity,  and one about the proper clustering algorithm. The procedure 
adopted here will employ a Ward algorithm based on squared Euclidean distances. The 
latter are chosen because  rather than examining the relative impact of the nine items on  
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left-right self-identification (as would measures of similarity), the focus here is on the 
absolute values of the nine coefficients. In other words, with respect to the research 
question it is more relevant whether a single beta coefficient is high or low, positive or  
negative than whether the nine standardized coefficients of two countries correlate or  
not.
The Ward algorithm appears to be an apt choice concerning the research question in 
several  respects:  First,  it  measures  homogeneity  within groups rather  than distances 
among their elements, which makes it easier to make valid and meaningful statements  
about  the characteristics of each cluster.  Second, it  tends to produce similarly sized 
clusters, which serves the purpose of identifying the major lines of division between 
countries as outlined in the hypotheses. Third, it produces groups displaying a similar 
amount of homogeneity,  which makes comparison between groups more meaningful 
than if  the  spread within the  clusters  varies  to  a  great  degree.  For  a  more  detailed  
overview  of  the  advantageous  characteristics  of  the  Ward  algorithm  see  Blashfield 
(1976).
3.3. Univariate description of the sample
To give the reader a more profound insight into the structure of the data used here, this 
section presents some basic figures describing the ESS 2008 sample. A total of 41027  
respondents from 21 countries are covered in the survey.
Table 2 presents an overview of the dependent variable for each country. Huge variation 
can be found as to the willingness (or possibly: the ability) of respondents to locate 
themselves  on  the  elven-point  scale.  Refusal  or  inability  to  reply  to  the  left-right 
question resulted in a missing value being assigned to the respective person in the data 
set. The rate of valid responses for left-right self-placement varies between 63.3 percent  
in Russia and an astonishing 97.9 percent in Norway. The overall picture suggests that 
countries  in  Northern  and Western  Europe  exhibit  above-average  response  rates.  In 
contrast, the seven post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe average at a 
mere 77.4 percent (unweighted average of reported country means). 
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Table 2: Mean left-right self-placement and sample size by country
Country Mean Standard deviation N Total N Valid responses
Belgium 4.93 1.95 1679 1760 95.4%
Bulgaria 4.92 2.62 1608 2230 72.1%
Switzerland 4.92 1.95 1684 1819 92.6%
Cyprus 5.08 3.04 1014 1215 83.5%
Germany 4.54 1.87 2536 2751 92.2%
Denmark 5.31 2.17 1546 1610 96.0%
Estonia 5.19 1.96 1301 1661 78.3%
Spain 4.54 1.98 2068 2576 80.3%
Finland 5.72 2.01 2086 2195 95.0%
France 4.80 2.30 1949 2073 94.0%
United Kingdom 5.01 1.85 2116 2352 90.0%
Hungary 5.56 2.41 1234 1544 79.9%
Israel 6.10 2.63 2240 2490 90.0%
Netherlands 5.15 1.99 1706 1778 96.0%
Norway 5.33 2.06 1517 1549 97.9%
Poland 5.75 2.15 1347 1619 83.2%
Portugal 4.83 1.95 1598 2367 67.5%
Russia 5.39 1.96 1591 2512 63.3%
Sweden 5.12 2.22 1777 1830 97.1%
Slovakia 4.73 2.32 1551 1810 85.7%
Slovenia 4.63 2.39 1022 1286 79.5%
Total 5.12 2.22 35170 41027 85.7%
Note: Figures report unweighted results.
Quite  a  high  amount  of  variation  is  found in  the  mean left-right  scores  for  the  21 
countries. Germany, Spain and Slovenia are furthest to the left with values below 4.7; 
Israel, Poland and Finland display the right-most mean placements with values above 
5.7; The most polarized country samples are found in Israel (2.63) and the south-east of 
Europe with Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Hungary displaying standard deviations between 2.4  
and 3.1, while in the United Kingdom and the Germany the extremes are of smaller 
significance (standard deviations below 1.9).
Tables 3 to 5 present mean self-placements of the respondents on each of the nine item 
scales. As can be seen, the figures display considerably high cross-national variation. 
For  instance,  France,  Estonia,  Sweden,  and Norway are  amongst  the lowest-scoring 
countries on all scales relating to religion, whereas the three most religious populations 
are clearly those of Poland, Cyprus, Slovakia, and Portugal. In general, respondents in 
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predominantly Protestant countries are less religious than those in Catholic or Orthodox 
countries (France and Finland being exceptions from this pattern). 
Being a country where religion is a defining element of the political landscape, Israel  
reports  the  highest  standard  deviations  for  religiosity  and  attendance.  The  former 
variable  even displays  a  trimodal  distribution  with  peaks  in  the  centre  and at  both  
extremes,  thus indicating a fair  degree of polarization within the populace as far  as 
religiosity and religious practice are concerned.
The correlation coefficients for the country-averages of the three religious scales yield 
values of 0.88 and above, which underscores the coherence of the three items selected 
for the religious dimension.
Table 3: Mean values of religious items by country
Country
Religiosity Attendance Praying
Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N
Belgium 4.77 3.01 1756 2.07 1.34 1758 2.77 2.26 1753
Bulgaria 4.26 2.52 2205 2.64 1.12 2211 2.93 1.91 2160
Switzerland 5.03 3.00 1801 2.48 1.40 1816 3.70 2.45 1800
Cyprus 6.60 2.16 1211 3.62 1.13 1211 5.01 2.05 1196
Germany 4.02 3.06 2738 2.23 1.34 2738 2.83 2.24 2704
Denmark 4.13 2.61 1605 2.11 1.12 1609 2.35 2.04 1600
Estonia 3.76 2.70 1644 2.17 1.02 1658 2.07 1.59 1647
Spain 4.51 2.81 2560 2.48 1.55 2559 3.41 2.33 2543
Finland 5.17 2.73 2190 2.31 1.13 2194 3.34 2.32 2187
France 3.61 2.86 2063 1.96 1.25 2069 2.51 2.09 2057
United Kingdom 4.05 3.00 2342 2.15 1.55 2348 3.02 2.43 2340
Hungary 4.29 3.21 1536 2.29 1.33 1538 3.11 2.35 1513
Israel 4.86 3.46 2450 2.94 2.03 2477 3.50 2.42 2463
Netherlands 4.85 3.02 1772 2.21 1.56 1778 3.14 2.55 1773
Norway 3.73 2.69 1547 2.06 1.14 1546 2.42 2.10 1538
Poland 6.41 2.38 1604 4.15 1.27 1606 5.28 1.99 1542
Portugal 5.95 2.39 2336 3.24 1.73 2304 4.73 2.36 2264
Russia 4.50 2.61 2480 2.30 1.27 2410 3.04 2.13 2305
Sweden 3.39 2.77 1824 2.04 1.12 1823 2.12 1.86 1829
Slovakia 6.08 3.15 1801 3.37 1.43 1805 4.40 2.48 1797
Slovenia 4.66 2.94 1235 2.80 1.81 1250 2.98 2.21 1232
Total 4.66 2.99 40700 2.53 1.52 40714 3.25 2.40 40243
Note: Figures report unweighted results.
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As to socio-economic issues, some interesting, if not counterintuitive, patterns emerge  
when looking at  the data.  For  instance,  the Scandinavian welfare  states of  Norway, 
Sweden, and Denmark are among the countries least approving of government efforts to 
reduce income inequality – a result possibly due to the thus far considerable extent of  
redistribution policies in place in these political systems.
Furthermore,  respondents  in  the  former  communist  states  of  Slovenia,  Poland,  and 
Bulgaria are less likely to support higher taxes and public services than people in most 
other  countries.  Strikingly,  it  appears  that  countries  with  high  mean  values  on  the 
income equality item display low means on the tax/spend-scale and vice-versa. Of all 
country samples, Hungarians, for instance, are most opposed to higher levels of taxation 
and public services (6.41), but at the same time most favourable towards government 
measures aimed at reducing income inequality (1.71).
Table 4: Mean values of socio-economic items by country
Country
Income equality Achievement Tax/spend
Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N
Belgium 2.23 1.06 1753 3.37 1.05 1756 4.94 1.76 1738
Bulgaria 1.91 1.11 2148 3.35 1.14 2133 5.15 2.27 1679
Switzerland 2.32 1.01 1788 3.35 1.00 1785 4.89 1.72 1751
Cyprus 2.00 0.96 1173 3.30 1.12 1149 4.28 2.59 1061
Germany 2.29 1.04 2713 3.44 0.98 2724 5.19 1.93 2600
Denmark 2.90 1.15 1568 3.67 0.96 1590 4.02 2.09 1578
Estonia 2.23 1.01 1625 3.63 0.96 1621 4.39 2.07 1509
Spain 2.01 0.86 2509 3.36 1.06 2523 4.72 1.87 2220
Finland 2.05 0.97 2179 2.68 1.12 2182 4.11 1.78 2156
France 1.96 1.08 2069 3.21 1.26 2067 4.96 1.97 2012
United Kingdom 2.48 1.07 2327 3.51 0.97 2328 4.77 2.20 2280
Hungary 1.71 0.88 1513 2.55 1.17 1519 6.41 2.35 1350
Israel 2.03 0.96 2434 3.41 1.11 2439 4.49 2.16 2163
Netherlands 2.58 1.08 1762 3.41 0.94 1761 4.72 1.60 1732
Norway 2.47 1.00 1545 3.36 0.96 1546 4.40 1.77 1533
Poland 2.16 1.00 1590 3.62 0.93 1588 5.53 2.10 1429
Portugal 1.80 0.74 2350 3.22 1.04 2284 5.09 2.05 1758
Russia 2.10 1.02 2438 3.05 1.05 2426 4.79 2.18 2000
Sweden 2.30 0.94 1806 3.24 1.01 1805 4.56 2.05 1760
Slovakia 2.18 0.82 1767 3.02 1.07 1783 4.80 2.28 1565
Slovenia 1.84 1.04 1273 2.93 1.03 1267 5.45 2.14 1187
Total 2.16 1.03 40301 3.27 1.08 40276 4.82 2.09 37061
Note: Figures report unweighted results
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It should be mentioned here that the tax/spend-question produces a somewhat higher 
non-response-rate than other items in a number of countries, such as Bulgaria (valid 
responses:  75%),  Portugal  (75%),  and  Russia  (80%).  Across  the  data  set,  the 
percentages of valid responses per country correspond closely between the tax/spend- 
and the left-right-item (r=0.90).  Clearly,  the tax/spend-question wording is  the most 
complex of the nine selected items (see table 1). However, lower response rates may 
also indicate that respondents know little about the respective policy issue.
Table  5  presents  the  three  variables  for  the  libertarian-authoritarian  dimension. 
Considering  that  lower  values  indicate  more  liberal  views  and  higher  values  more 
conservative stances, Sweden stands out as one of the most liberal countries in the data 
set. Russians, on the other hand, are most authoritarian of all country subsets, with the 
highest average values for homosexuals and immigration.
Table 5: Mean values of libertarian-authoritarian items by country
Country
Homosexuals Immigration Obedience
Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev. N
Belgium 1.80 0.99 1748 5.10 2.05 1736 4.16 0.87 1760
Bulgaria 2.79 1.45 1841 4.46 2.45 1791 4.71 0.54 2206
Switzerland 1.89 0.97 1806 4.49 1.87 1745 3.38 1.14 1816
Cyprus 2.67 1.30 1168 5.30 2.52 1204 4.35 0.73 1212
Germany 1.98 0.97 2714 4.95 2.18 2692 3.45 1.04 2740
Denmark 1.59 0.86 1596 4.30 2.18 1593 3.85 0.93 1606
Estonia 2.96 1.23 1570 5.59 2.19 1557 3.57 1.09 1626
Spain 1.90 1.01 2502 5.10 2.18 2466 4.24 0.73 2570
Finland 2.15 1.15 2184 4.48 1.86 2170 4.07 0.89 2188
France 1.65 1.01 2059 5.29 2.13 2042 4.15 1.12 2073
United Kingdom 2.03 0.93 2332 5.51 2.49 2324 4.25 0.75 2350
Hungary 2.84 1.32 1379 6.21 2.17 1393 3.97 1.00 1532
Israel 2.44 1.31 2214 4.60 2.60 2335 4.19 0.88 2456
Netherlands 1.63 0.78 1768 4.83 1.94 1751 3.99 0.80 1775
Norway 1.97 0.98 1545 4.67 1.98 1539 3.77 0.89 1547
Poland 2.78 1.18 1523 4.03 1.97 1488 4.31 0.60 1614
Portugal 2.36 1.10 2204 5.71 2.06 2164 4.17 0.76 2359
Russia 3.39 1.28 2063 6.54 2.36 2275 4.15 0.83 2488
Sweden 1.76 0.83 1816 3.80 2.09 1794 3.44 1.03 1819
Slovakia 2.92 1.15 1694 5.49 1.82 1633 3.81 1.00 1801
Slovenia 2.62 1.24 1225 5.48 2.29 1234 3.50 1.03 1281
Total 2.26 1.21 38951 5.05 2.28 38926 3.99 0.96 40819
Note: Figures report unweighted results
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In  general,  Scandinavian  and  West  European  respondents  tend  to  place  themselves 
closer towards the libertarian pole of each of the three scales whereas more authoritarian 
views are found in the post-communist states of Eastern Europe. An exception to this  
rule is found in Bulgaria and Poland, where respondents take moderate to liberal stances 
on immigration. Similarly, Estonians and Slovenians express rather permissive views 
when asked about the role of authority and obedience in school.
When examining the relationship between country averages and the respective standard 
deviations,  it  turns out that  these are positively correlated for the homosexuals item 
(r=0.85)  and  negatively  correlated  for  the  obedience  item  (r=-0.83).  These  figures 
suggest that attitudes towards homosexuals are less divisive an issue the more liberal a 
society is on average, whereas the opposite applies to views of authority and obedience 
in school.
Following the  descriptive  overview of  the  ESS sample,  the  next  section  will  apply 
multivariate methods – more precisely: linear regression and cluster analysis – to test 
the influence of the three dimensions of value orientations on left-right self-placement 
in the 21 countries featured in the data set. In the course of this analysis, some initial 
conjectures can be made about the six hypotheses outlined above.
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4. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
4.1. Testing individual dimensions: linear regression analyses
For each of the three dimensions of value orientations linear regression analyses will be 
conducted.  On  the  basis  of  the  regression  coefficients  and  the  overall  explained 
variance, the salience of the respective dimension can be assessed for each country.  
Furthermore, the relative weight of each issue item can be estimated.
4.1.1. Regression analysis: the religious dimension
Table 6 shows that the strength of religion as a predictor of left-right self-placement 
varies considerably across Europe. While in places such as Cyprus or Sweden there 
seems to  be  no  statistically  significant  link  between  the  two,  other  countries,  most 
notably  the  predominantly  Catholic  nations  of  Spain,  Poland,  and  Slovenia,  exhibit  
explained variances between 6.7 and 13.9 percent. In most of Europe, however, only 
very modest effects can be observed. 
Nevertheless,  when  looking  at  the  explained  variances  in  more  detail,  the  role  of  
different Christian denominations becomes apparent. Four out of the five countries with 
the highest r-squares are largely Catholic countries, whereas the five countries with the 
lowest explained variance are Protestant or Orthodox (or,  as  in the case of Estonia, 
mostly  unaffiliated  or  atheist,  see  Statistical  Office  of  Estonia  2002:  30).  Both, 
Protestantism and Orthodoxy experienced schisms from the Roman Catholic church and  
subsequently established national churches (e. g. the Lutheran Churches in England and 
the Scandinavian countries, or the Bulgarian, Russian, or Greek Orthodox Churches in 
Eastern Europe), which – according to Lipset and Rokkan (1967) – prevented conflict  
between religious and secular authorities in the course of the nation-building process. 
Thus, the religious-secular cleavage became much more salient in Catholic societies. 
The results in table 6 conform to this expectation. Still, whether there is strong support  
for H1 needs to be examined drawing on external data on religious denominations in the  
21 countries under study. 
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Table 6: Regressing left-right self-placement on religious items
Country Intercept Religiosity Attendance Praying Adj. R2 N
Belgium 4.42 0.07 0.17 -0.06 0.023 1673
0.10** 0.02** 0.04** 0.03*
Bulgaria 4.36 -0.01 0.26 -0.02 0.009 1563
0.17** 0.03 0.07** 0.05
Switzerland 4.36 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.023 1660
0.10** 0.02 0.04 0.03*
Cyprus 4.65 -0.11 0.20 0.08 0.004 998
0.35** 0.06 0.11 0.07
Germany 4.09 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.031 2497
0.08** 0.02** 0.04** 0.02
Denmark 4.89 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.012 1535
0.12 0.03** 0.06 0.03
Estonia 5.37 -0.03 0.06 -0.11 0.007 1283
0.13** 0.03 0.07 0.04*
Spain 3.63 0.16 0.13 -0.03 0.077 2038
0.08** 0.02** 0.04** 0.03
Finland 4.76 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.059 2075
0.11** 0.02** 0.05 0.03
France 3.89 0.12 0.22 0.01 0.060 1936
0.10** 0.02** 0.05** 0.03
United Kingdom 4.80 0.08 -0.04 0.01 0.008 2101
0.07** 0.02** 0.03 0.02
Hungary 4.94 0.12 0.19 -0.10 0.027 1216
0.14** 0.03** 0.07** 0.04*
Israel 5.31 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.056 2181
0.10** 0.02** 0.04 0.04**
Netherlands 4.63 0.05 0.13 -0.01 0.021 1697
0.10** 0.02* 0.04** 0.03
Norway 4.98 0.08 0.06 -0.03 0.010 1506
0.11** 0.03** 0.06 0.03
Poland 3.83 0.11 0.23 0.06 0.067 1283
0.21** 0.04** 0.07** 0.04
Portugal 4.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.022 1505
0.13** 0.03* 0.04 0.03
Russia 4.61 0.14 0.14 -0.06 0.044 1459
0.11** 0.03** 0.06* 0.03
Sweden 4.79 0.09 0.06 -0.04 0.010 1770
0.11** 0.03 0.06 0.04
Slovakia 4.41 0.12 0.12 -0.16 0.018 1534
0.13** 0.03** 0.05** 0.04**
Slovenia 2.84 0.08 0.47 0.03 0.139 985
0.16** 0.03* 0.07** 0.05
Total 4.32 0.10 0.14 -0.02 0.042 34495
0.02** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01**
Note: Weighted least squares regressions (using “dweight” for single-country models and “pweight*dweight” for the full model);  
reported values are unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in italics; ** p-value < 0,01; * p-value < 0,05
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As to the regression coefficients, it turns out that religiosity and church attendance are 
the more powerful predictors of left-right self-placement compared with the frequency 
of praying reported by the respondents. This variable is insignificant for all but two 
countries and – counter to our expectations – negative in half of the cases, even when 
conducting the regression for the whole sample. 
While this effect is puzzling at first, it turns out that, when entered into the regression 
equation without  the  other  two variables  relating to  religion,  the  coefficient  for  the  
praying item is positive and statistically significant for most countries. We can therefore  
conclude that the negative signs in table 6 are largely due to the overlap between the 
independent variables; indeed, the correlations between the predictors not only cause 
the positive sign for the praying item to disappear but  result  in modest  amounts of 
multicollinearity  in  some  country  models.  However,  with  variance  inflation  factors  
(VIF) below 2.5 in all countries but Slovakia (VIF values between 2.55 and 2.95), there 
is no cause for concern as to the stability of the reported coefficients.
In general,  it  can be held that in the majority of European countries, people tend to 
position  themselves  the  more  to  the  right  (1)  the  more  religious  they  consider 
themselves and (2) the more often they attend religious services. Furthermore, there are  
trends in the data suggesting that the salience of the religious dimension as a predictor 
of left-right self-placement varies between countries with mostly Catholic affiliates and 
countries with other denominations accounting for the majority of the population.
4.1.2. Regression analysis: the socio-economic dimension
Table 7 presents the results  of the linear regression analysis  for the socio-economic 
dimension.  At  first  glance,  it  becomes  clear  that  this  dimension  possesses  greater 
explanatory  power  than  the  religious  dimension.  Each  item  yields  a  significant  
coefficient in at least two thirds of the countries. 
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Achievement Tax/Spend Adj. R2 N
Belgium 3.49 0.11 0.18 0.12 0.030 1655
0.20** 0.05* 0.05** 0.03**
Bulgaria 3.78 0.25 0.17 0.04 0.021 1265
0.30** 0.07** 0.06** 0.03
Switzerland 2.19 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.107 1618
0.21** 0.05** 0.05** 0.03**
Cyprus 4.07 0.33 0.04 0.07 0.012 861
0.41** 0.11** 0.09 0.04
Germany 2.48 0.27 0.26 0.12 0.080 2412
0.16** 0.04** 0.04** 0.02**
Denmark 1.51 0.37 0.47 0.25 0.231 1496
0.20** 0.05** 0.06** 0.03**
Estonia 4.29 0.33 -0.04 0.08 0.035 1203
0.27** 0.06** 0.06 0.03**
Spain 3.63 0.21 0.12 0.02 0.014 1815
0.21** 0.05** 0.04** 0.03
Finland 3.46 0.46 0.30 0.12 0.136 2047
0.14** 0.05** 0.04** 0.02**
France 1.97 0.43 0.39 0.15 0.136 1902
0.18** 0.05** 0.04** 0.02**
United Kingdom 2.77 0.26 0.28 0.12 0.092 2052
0.16** 0.04** 0.04** 0.02**
Hungary 5.30 -0.21 -0.03 0.12 0.018 1108
0.29** 0.08* 0.06 0.03**
Israel 4.16 0.05 0.46 0.08 0.040 1983
0.25** 0.06 0.05** 0.03**
Netherlands 2.65 0.37 0.25 0.14 0.100 1660
0.21** 0.05** 0.05** 0.03**
Norway 1.83 0.39 0.42 0.26 0.189 1501
0.20** 0.05** 0.06** 0.03**
Poland 5.32 -0.03 0.16 -0.02 0.002 1220
0.30** 0.06 0.07* 0.03
Portugal 4.09 0.14 0.11 0.02 0.005 1242
0.25** 0.07 0.05* 0.03
Russia 5.11 0.09 0.17 -0.10 0.020 1359
0.22** 0.05 0.05** 0.03**
Sweden 1.07 0.52 0.50 0.27 0.279 1686
0.17** 0.06** 0.05** 0.02**
Slovakia 2.41 0.35 0.22 0.22 0.103 1366
0.23** 0.06** 0.06** 0.03**
Slovenia 3.23 0.02 0.13 0.18 0.026 959
0.32** 0.10 0.08 0.04**
Total 3.41 0.22 0.24 0.07 0.044 32410
0.05** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01**
Note: Weighted least squares regressions (using “dweight” for single-country models and “pweight*dweight” for the full model);  
reported values are unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in italics; ** p-value < 0,01; * p-value < 0,05
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While the total explained variance is only at four percent, the maximum adjusted r-
squared value for a single country is an astonishing 0.28 for Sweden. The other Nordic 
countries (Norway, Finland, Denmark) and France  – the mother country of left and 
right – complement the top five nations concerning the salience of the socio-economic  
dimension.
With explained variances between eight and eleven percent, a group of Central and West 
European  countries  displays  a  fair  level  of  salience  for  class-conflict-related  value 
orientations. The only post-communist state falling into that category is Slovakia (0.10). 
All other countries of the former Eastern bloc return explained variances below four 
percent.  These  states  comprise  the  bottom half  when looking at  the  salience  of  the 
socio-economic items – together with the Iberian countries of Portugal and Spain, and a  
group  of  states  where  ethnic  or  cultural  rather  than  economic  conflicts  obviously 
dominate the political agenda: Cyprus, Israel, and Belgium.
As  to  the  regression  coefficients,  it  turns  out  that  all  three  items  return  significant 
predictors in at least 16 out of 21 countries. In most cases, the coefficients are positive 
and significant. However, six negative figures are reported in table 7, all of which are 
found in post-communist  states and only two of which are  significant  (tax/spend in 
Russia, and income equality in Hungary). While the latter result partially contradicts 
H4,  there  is  good  evidence  from  the  regression  models  that  the  socio-economic 
dimension is not as closely related to left-right self-identification in the states of the 
former Soviet sphere of influence when compared to Western and Northern Europe.
Furthermore, the results in tables 6 and 7 imply that the socio-economic dimension is 
more salient than the religious-secular divide. Admittedly, the explained variances for  
the total models do not differ too much, but by calculating an unweighted mean across 
the 21 countries it can be concluded that religious dimension (0.03) is less important in 
determining  left  and  right  than  the  socio-economic  dimension  (0.08).  These  figures 
reflect the fact that in all but seven countries the adjusted r-squared values are higher for  
the socio-economic than for the religious items.
Comparison  of  dimensions  aside,  the  overall  picture  emerging  from  the  analysis 
presented in table 7 strongly suggests that people across Europe tend to view themselves 
the more to the left the more they support (1) government measures to reduce income 
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equality,  (2)  equal  pay independent  of  individual  talents  and efforts,  and (3)  higher 
levels of taxation as well as public services.
It can therefore be concluded that the socio-economic values associated with the class 
cleavage that dominated (West) European politics for most of the twentieth century are  
still a core element in defining the meaning of left and right.
4.1.3. Regression analysis: the libertarian-authoritarian dimension
The  third  dimension  to  be  tested  encompasses  items  that  relate  to  libertarian-
authoritarian values. Table 8 presents the results. While the explained variance in the 
full model is a little lower than for the other two dimensions, the overall relevance of 
the libertarian-authoritarian items is highlighted by the fact that 42 out of 63 coefficients  
are significant. 
As to the salience of libertarian-authoritarian issues,  Central  and Northern European 
countries yield the highest shares of explained variance, whereas Eastern and Southern 
European states end up on the other side of the spectrum. With Switzerland, France, and 
Denmark  exhibiting  r-squares  greater  than  0.10  and  countries  like  Cyrus,  Slovakia, 
Portugal, Estonia, and Hungary displaying explained variances below one percent, a  
pattern similar to that characterising the socio-economic dimension emerges. Indeed, 
there is a positive and reasonably high correlation between the r-squares of the socio-
economic and the libertarian-authoritarian dimensions (r=0.56, p-value < 0.01).
However, even more insight can be gained from looking at the regression coefficients. 
All  three  items  yield  significant  coefficients  in  at  least  twelve  out  of  21  cases. 
Especially the item relating to homosexuals proves to be a valid predictor of left-right  
self-placement in a large number of countries (18 out of 21).
Comparing table 8 with tables 6 and 7, it can be held that the number of coefficients 
whose  direction  is  counter  to  conventional  expectations  –  that  is:  negative  –  is 
considerably  higher  for  the  libertarian-authoritarian  items  than  for  the  other  two 
dimensions. More specifically, 20 out of a total of 63 coefficients in table 8 display 
negative signs. 14 out of these 20 coefficients are found in regression models of former 
communist states. The country samples of Russia, Estonia, and Bulgaria even yield a  
total of five coefficients that are negative and statistically significant.
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Table 8: Regressing left-right self-placement on libertarian-authoritarian items
Country Intercept Homosexuals Immigration Obedience Adj. R2 N
Belgium 3.46 0.16 0.02 0.26 0.021 1653
0.25** 0.05** 0.02 0.06**
Bulgaria 7.21 -0.30 -0.07 -0.22 0.033 1231
0.65** 0.05** 0.03* 0.13
Switzerland 2.68 0.32 0.25 0.15 0.104 1631
0.19** 0.05** 0.02** 0.04**
Cyprus 5.08 -0.02 -0.07 0.10 0.001 963
0.63** 0.08 0.04 0.13
Germany 3.06 0.27 0.07 0.18 0.050 2472
0.14** 0.04** 0.02** 0.04**
Denmark 2.52 0.18 0.18 0.45 0.104 1525
0.23** 0.06** 0.03** 0.06**
Estonia 5.88 -0.13 -0.04 -0.01 0.007 1204
0.25** 0.05** 0.03 0.05
Spain 2.38 0.41 0.08 0.23 0.065 1968
0.27** 0.05** 0.02** 0.06**
Finland 4.22 0.27 -0.05 0.28 0.040 2064
0.22** 0.04** 0.02* 0.05**
France 1.76 0.17 0.24 0.36 0.111 1922
0.21** 0.05** 0.02** 0.05**
United Kingdom 2.71 0.15 0.05 0.40 0.046 2085
0.23** 0.04** 0.02** 0.05**
Hungary 5.10 0.20 0.02 -0.05 0.009 1061
0.36** 0.06** 0.03 0.07
Israel 4.64 0.09 -0.06 0.33 0.015 1947
0.29** 0.05* 0.02** 0.07**
Netherlands 2.36 0.33 0.16 0.37 0.071 1677
0.27** 0.06** 0.02** 0.06**
Norway 2.75 0.26 0.15 0.37 0.081 1507
0.24** 0.05** 0.03** 0.06**
Poland 4.65 0.24 -0.01 0.12 0.016 1220
0.47** 0.05** 0.03 0.10
Portugal 4.44 0.18 -0.00 -0.02 0.008 1423
0.34** 0.05** 0.03 0.07
Russia 5.99 -0.10 -0.07 0.06 0.010 1315
0.33** 0.05* 0.02** 0.07
Sweden 3.50 0.12 0.05 0.36 0.037 1731
0.20** 0.07 0.03 0.05**
Slovakia 5.52 -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 0.002 1417
0.31** 0.05 0.04 0.06
Slovenia 3.19 0.42 0.06 -0.00 0.047 964
0.31** 0.07** 0.04 0.07
Total 3.41 0.18 0.04 0.25 0.035 32924
0.05** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01**
Note: Weighted least squares regressions (using “dweight” for single-country models and “pweight*dweight” for the full model);  
reported values are unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in italics; ** p-value < 0,01; * p-value < 0,05
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While these figures give support to H6, it must be acknowledged that a fair number of 
coefficients in post-communist states are positive, albeit that only three are positive and 
significance at the same time.
In  addition  to  the  counterintuitive  findings  for  the  post-communist  states,  the 
immigration item returns a negative coefficient for two more countries:  Finland and 
Israel. 
Finland is an outlier within the group of Nordic countries due to the relative importance  
of the religious dimension as compared to Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. Still, there is  
no ad-hoc explanation for the negative sign of the immigration predictor in this case.  
Admittedly, Finland has not experienced the emergence of a strong anti-immigration 
party on the right of the political spectrum as have, for instance, Denmark and Norway. 
The  success  of Perussuomalaiset (“True  Finns”)  has  been  modest  at  best  and  only 
recently  has  this  party  made  inroads  in  attracting  a  greater  share  of  the  electorate. 
However,  the  absence  of  a  strong  anti-immigration  party  alone  fails  to  explain  a 
statistically significant and negative coefficient for the immigration variable, since the 
political systems of the United Kingdom or Germany have had a similar degree of right-
wing  radicalism  in  their  national  party  structure,  and  still  display  the  expected 
coefficients, that is, positive and significant.
Israel, on the other hand, is a country whose national identity is based on the notion of  
immigration. Russian-born Jews, for instance, are amongst the core constituencies of 
the religious-orthodox parties that are considered to be at the rightmost of the political  
spectrum in Israel. The country’s unique history and the special role of immigration in  
the  process  of  nation-building  offer  a  reasonable  explanation  for  the  negative  and 
significant  estimator  reported  in  table  8.  This  result  is  consistent  with  a  study  of  
Raijman et al. (2003) who find that right-wing political orientation has a negative and 
significant effect on attitudes towards foreigners in Germany but not in Israel.
4.1.4. Reviewing the three dimensions
After  presenting the three sets  of  regression analyses,  it  appears  apt  to  draw a few 
comparisons and obtain an overview of the dimensions’ salience. The graph in figure 1 
plots the explained variances for each country.
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It  becomes  visible  that,  in  a  number  of  countries,  the  three  dimensions  of  value 
orientations fail to account for a reasonable amount of the variance in the distribution of 
the dependent variable. States such as Cyprus, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
and Belgium make up this rather heterogeneous group of countries displaying only very  
modest model fits. Even by generous standards, the explained variances for countries  
like Israel or Poland are not high. Clearly, the left-right semantics are more prominent a  
feature of political competition in Western and Northern Europe.
This  fact  is  further  illuminated  by  a  correlation  of  the  explained  variances  of  each 
dimension with the rate of valid responses for the left-right item (see table 2). Figure 2 
depicts a scatterplot revealing the relationship between the explained variance for the  
socio-economic dimension and the left-right response rate.
Figure 2: Socio-economic dimension and left-right response rate







































Note: r=70.4 (p-value < 0.01).
The correlation coefficient of 70.4 (the respective values are 55.6 with a p-value < 0.01 
for the libertarian-authoritarian and -15.6 with a p-value above 0.5 for the religious 
dimension) underscores the relationship between the common understanding of the left-
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right semantics and the extent to which policy issues or value orientations are related to 
it. Obviously, respondents in Western Europe and the Nordic countries are much more 
familiar with the concept of left and right than those living in post-communist states.  
The more acquainted a person with a political heuristic such as left and right, the more 
willing she may be to place herself on the left-right scale and the more capable she is of 
associating to it political issues in a meaningful way.
Returning  to  figure  1,  it  becomes  clear  that  most  countries  display  a  one-  or  two-
dimensional account of the left-right schema. Only in France is the explained variance 
for  each of  the three value dimensions greater  than 0.05.  As to  the aforementioned 
relationship between the  socio-economic  and the  libertarian-authoritarian dimension,  
figure 1 shows that – aside from the correlation – the former is, in general, of greater 
explanatory power than the latter. Also, it can be seen that, by and large, the religious 
dimension  is  more  salient  in  countries  where  the  other  two dimensions  play  a  less 
important role.
At least concerning value orientations, the concept of left and right is not as universal 
among mass electorates as may be expected from its wide-spread use in the discipline of  
political science. Whether other types of variables (e. g. socio-structural factors, party  
identification) are more common predictors of left-right self-placement across Europe is 
beyond the scope of this study.
4.1.5. Regression analysis: the three dimensions combined
In a final regression analysis all nine items are included in the model. Thus, it can be 
assessed how the three dimensions relate to each other, or more precisely: whether the 
significance or the direction of coefficients change in comparison with the three single-
dimension regression models. The model specification is as follows:
y = b0 + x1b1 + x2b2 + x3b3 + x4b4 + x5b5 + x6b6 + x7b7 + x8b8 + x9b9 +ε
In  this  equation,  x1 to  x3 represent  the  religious  items,  x4 to  x6 the  socio-economic 
variables, and x7 to x9 the libertarian-authoritarian items. At a later point in this study, 
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the standardized coefficients reported by the nine-item-models will be used as variables 
for  the subsequent  cluster  analysis.  Table  9  presents the regression analyses for  the 
models encompassing all nine independent variables.
Comparing table 9 with tables 6 to 8, some valuable insights as to the relationships 
between the three dimensions of value orientations can be obtained. Most strikingly, the  
coefficient for the homosexuals item changes from positive and significant to positive or 
negative  insignificant  in  no  less  than  seven  countries:  Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  
United  Kingdom,  Israel,  Poland,  and  Portugal.  Only  in  Slovakia  is  the  coefficient 
rendered significant in the full model while being insignificant in the three-item-model,  
but then this coefficient changes from negative insignificant to negative significant.
Most likely, these interaction effects are due to the inclusion of the religious and the 
libertarian-authoritarian dimension in one regression model.  Tolerance or intolerance 
vis-à-vis gays and lesbians is in many societies a question closely related to religious 
beliefs. Indeed, when regressing the homosexuals item on the three variables used for 
the religious dimension, quite a substantial amount of variance can be explained: 16.8 % 
in Israel, 14.1 % in the Netherlands, 13.3 % in Spain and Switzerland. Moreover, of the 
63 coefficients (three independent variables in 21 countries), only eight are negative and 
of those only one is significant (attendance in Bulgaria). Hence, there are good reasons 
to assume that the weaker performance of the homosexuals variable in the nine-item-
models is due to considerable overlap with variables from the religious dimension.
The picture  is  less  clear  when turning  to  the  immigration  variable.  Here,  we see  a 
decrease in significance from the regression models in table 8 to those in table 9, albeit 
only for countries whose coefficient was negative in the first place (Bulgaria, Finland, 
Israel, and Russia). Fitting different regressions to immigration as a dependent variable 
it turns out that the religious variables possess hardly any predictive power – with Israel  
being a minor exception to that rule. Some modest effects can be observed from the  
socio-economic items, although the country-wise r-squares exceed a value of 0.05 only 
in the United Kingdom.
The third variable changing in an unambiguous manner through the incorporation of all  
nine items is  the achievement  variable  which turns from positive and significant  to 
positive and insignificant in three countries (Bulgaria, Spain, and Portugal).
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Table 9: Regressing left-right self-placement on all three dimensions
Religious-secular Socio-economic






Belgium 2.10 0.07 0.15 -0.07 0.12 0.14 0.11
0.31** 0.02** 0.04** 0.03* 0.05* 0.05** 0.03**
Bulgaria 4.74 0.01 0.30 -0.01 0.23 0.12 0.02
0.83** 0.04 0.09** 0.06 0.07** 0.07 0.04
Switzerland 0.18 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.26 0.31 0.18
0.26 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05** 0.05** 0.03**
Cyprus 3.08 -0.09 0.39 0.01 0.34 0.06 0.09
0.91** 0.07 0.12** 0.07 0.11** 0.09 0.04*
Germany 0.67 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.29 0.24 0.11
0.21** 0.02** 0.04* 0.02 0.04** 0.04** 0.02**
Denmark -0.10 0.08 -0.06 0.03 0.37 0.38 0.23
0.26 0.02** 0.05 0.03 0.05** 0.06** 0.03**
Estonia 4.75 -0.01 0.06 -0.08 0.28 -0.00 0.08
0.40** 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.06** 0.06 0.03**
Spain 1.62 0.13 0.09 -0.01 0.19 0.03 -0.03
0.33** 0.02** 0.04* 0.03 0.05** 0.04 0.03
Finland 1.77 0.15 -0.01 0.04 0.50 0.27 0.12
0.24** 0.02** 0.04 0.02 0.04** 0.04** 0.02**
France -0.36 0.08 0.23 0.01 0.41 0.31 0.10
0.24 0.02** 0.05** 0.03 0.05** 0.04** 0.02**
United Kingdom 1.29 0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.29 0.23 0.09
0.25** 0.02** 0.03 0.02 0.04** 0.04** 0.02**
Hungary 4.94 0.11 0.20 -0.12 -0.27 -0.07 0.09
0.49** 0.03** 0.08* 0.05* 0.09** 0.07 0.03**
Israel 3.15 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.53 0.07
0.39** 0.02** 0.04 0.04** 0.06 0.06** 0.03*
Netherlands -0.04 0.06 0.08 -0.03 0.41 0.22 0.09
0.31 0.02** 0.04* 0.03 0.05** 0.05** 0.03**
Norway 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.42 0.35 0.21
0.27 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05** 0.05** 0.03**
Poland 2.74 0.12 0.20 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.00
0.60** 0.04** 0.08** 0.04 0.07 0.07* 0.03
Portugal 3.95 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.16 0.06 -0.02
0.49** 0.03 0.05 0.03** 0.08* 0.06 0.03
Russia 5.04 0.14 0.06 -0.02 0.08 0.15 -0.09
0.45** 0.03** 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06** 0.03**
Sweden 0.02 0.08 0.05 -0.05 0.53 0.46 0.26
0.23 0.02** 0.05 0.03 0.06** 0.05** 0.02**
Slovakia 2.78 0.10 0.24 -0.14 0.41 0.13 0.21
0.44** 0.03** 0.06** 0.04** 0.07** 0.07* 0.03**
Slovenia 1.07 0.09 0.38 0.04 0.18 0.01 0.14
0.42* 0.03* 0.08** 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.03**
Total 1.32 0.09 0.10 -0.02 0.27 0.22 0.06
0.07** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01** 0.01** 0.01**
Note: Weighted least squares regressions (using “dweight” for single-country models and “pweight*dweight” for the full model);
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Immigration Obedience Adj. R2 N Country
0.08 0.03 0.19 0.060 1631 Belgium
0.05 0.02 0.06**
-0.27 -0.05 -0.11 0.053 1010 Bulgaria
0.06** 0.03 0.14
0.22 0.20 0.16 0.189 1554 Switzerland
0.05** 0.02** 0.04**
0.02 -0.10 0.10 0.027 828 Cyprus
0.08 0.04* 0.15
0.26 0.11 0.13 0.158 2335 Germany
0.04** 0.02** 0.04**
0.08 0.13 0.29 0.288 1472 Denmark
0.06 0.02** 0.06**
-0.11 -0.00 -0.01 0.033 1129 Estonia
0.05* 0.03 0.05
0.19 0.10 0.23 0.113 1732 Spain
0.05** 0.02** 0.06**
0.11 -0.03 0.18 0.211 2027 Finland
0.04** 0.02 0.05**
-0.00 0.22 0.24 0.245 1867 France
0.05 0.02** 0.04**
0.07 0.05 0.28 0.124 2018 United Kingdom
0.04 0.02** 0.05**
0.21 0.01 -0.13 0.054 964 Hungary
0.06** 0.03 0.08
-0.07 -0.05 0.02 0.096 1739 Israel
0.05 0.02 0.07
0.30 0.17 0.32 0.186 1626 Netherlands
0.06** 0.02** 0.06**
0.13 0.11 0.29 0.230 1484 Norway
0.05* 0.02** 0.05**
0.07 -0.00 0.08 0.064 1093 Poland
0.06 0.03 0.11
0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.025 1100 Portugal
0.06 0.03 0.07
-0.18 -0.03 0.06 0.074 1091 Russia
0.05** 0.03 0.07
0.09 0.02 0.20 0.298 1652 Sweden
0.06 0.02 0.05**
-0.17 -0.02 -0.11 0.138 1238 Slovakia
0.06** 0.04 0.07
0.25 0.06 -0.03 0.171 877 Slovenia
0.07** 0.04 0.07
0.11 0.08 0.21 0.114 30477 Total
0.01** 0.001** 0.01**
Reported values are unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in italics; ** p-value < 0,01;
* p-value < 0,05
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Again,  some  minor  effects  can  be  observed  when  regressing  achievement  on  the 
libertarian-authoritarian dimension, which  hints at some possible interferences of the  
immigration and achievement variables in the full country models. The items of the  
religious dimension do not play a significant role in this respect.
While some changes in significance and direction of the coefficients can be observed 
when moving from the  single  dimension  models  to  the  full  models  in  table  9,  the  
adjusted  r-squares  are  more  or  less  stable.  By  and  large,  the  explained  variances 
reported here correspond to the sum of the adjusted r-squares in tables 6 to 8.
Sweden and Denmark come out on top of the field with explained variances of just 
under 30 percent. France, Norway, and Finland complement the group of countries with 
adjusted r-squares above 0.20. The prevalence of the Nordic countries is undoubtedly 
due to the influence of the socio-economic dimension.
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In figure 3 it becomes evident that the total explained variance is unevenly distributed 
across regions in Europe. The bottom half of the graph is predominantly made up of 
countries of the former communist realm, whereas the top half is largely composed of 
states in Northern and Western Europe.
The two most  notable  outliers  in  this  respect  are  Slovenia  and Belgium. Slovenia’s 
position in figure 3 is owed to the considerable predictive capacities of the variables 
capturing the religious-secular dimension – a result that confirms the findings of Norris  
and Inglehart (2004: 206) who find the correlation of left-right orientation and religious 
values in Slovenia to be one of the highest in Europe. Moreover, their results suggest 
that  effect  of  religion  on  left-right  self-placement  has  increased  in  the  almost  two 
decades since the establishment  of Slovenia  as an independent  state.  What  is  more,  
Benoit and Laver (2006: 285) show how this relationship transforms into the realm of 
party politics: The correlation of eight Slovenian parties’ positions on religious-secular 
values and their general left-right positions amounts to 0.93 (religious scale reversed).
Belgium represents the “negative” outlier of all West European countries (assuming that 
the younger democracies of Spain and Portugal are a class of their own) with respect to 
the variance explained by the three value dimensions. The most obvious explanation for 
this result is the emergence of a cross-cutting ethno-linguistic cleavage between Dutch-
speaking Flemings and francophone Walloons which renders other social divisions less 
salient. Accordingly, De Winter et al. (2006: 945) hold that
[i]n  recent  decades,  two  of  the  three  traditionally  cross-cutting  cleavages  have  lost  salience  for  a 
significant  part  of  the  electorate.  The  denominational  cleavage  […]  once  most  structured  voting 
behaviour.  […] From the 1960s onward, this cleavage lost  weight and by the turn of the century its 
relevance  for  structuring  voting  behaviour  was  seriously  restricted.  […]  A similar,  but  less  marked,  
development affects the [socio-economic] left–right cleavage.
This account offers a plausible explication for the comparatively poor showing of the 
regression models for Belgium. 
While it seems probable that a similar explanation – ethnic conflict superimposed over 
other social divisions –  applies for the case of Cyprus, the low r-square for Portugal is 
puzzling,  especially  considering  that  Spain  –  a  country  with  a  similar  history  of  
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democratization – displays a total explained variance of 11.3 percent, with variables 
from all three dimensions contributing significantly to the fit of the model.
4.2. Testing the six hypotheses
Drawing on the results of the regression analyses as well as external data, this section 
tests the six hypotheses outlined in section 3.1. Two hypotheses were proposed for each 
dimension of value orientations.
4.2.1. The religious dimension
H1 draws on Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) account of the emergence of the state-church 
cleavage. Wherever national churches were established as a consequence of schisms 
from the Roman Catholic Church, the potential for conflict between the nation-building 
ambitions of secular leaders and the claim to influence over public policies by religious  
authorities was considerably lowered. Hence, H1 states:
H1 The religious dimension of the left-right schema is more salient in predominantly  
Catholic societies than in predominantly Protestant or Orthodox ones.
Testing this hypothesis requires establishing a correlation between the salience of the 
religious-secular dimension (as expressed by the explained variances in table 6) and 
statistics on religious denominations – more precisely: Catholics – for the 21 countries  
covered here. Since official international sources (such as Eurostat, the OECD, or the  
UN) do not collect data on religious denominations, I rely on the figures assembled by  
Cipriani  (2009:  114).  These  data,  however,  report  no  percentages  of  Catholics  for 
Estonia, Cyprus, and Israel.
For the two former countries, national census data can be consulted (Statistical Service  
of the Republic of Cyprus 2003; Statistical Office of Estonia 2002) to get exact figures 
on religious beliefs. Israel is a more problematic case: Not only do the census figures 
fail to report numbers for separate Christian denominations; the peculiar relationship 
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between  Judaism and  Zionism suggests  that  Israel  is  an  exceptional  case  as  far  as 
relations between religion and the state are concerned. On these grounds it appears apt 
to leave out Israel from the subsequent analysis.
Figure  4  displays  the  correspondence  between  the  percentage  of  Catholics  and  the 
variance explained by the religious dimension for 20 countries. There is a positive and 
relatively strong correlation (r=44.3, p-value=0.05) between the two variables. When 
regressing the saliency of the religious dimension on the percentage of Catholics,  it 
turns  out  that  for  each  added  percentage  point  in  the  latter  variable,  the  explained 
variance for the religious dimension rises by 0.043 percent.
Figure 4: Catholics and the saliency of the religious dimension




















































Note: Data on Catholics  from Cipriani  (2009: 113); Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus (2003); Statistical Office of  
Estonia (2002); * Norway, + Bulgaria.
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A few outliers from the depicted relationship can easily be identified. These are Finland 
and Russia where the salience of the religious dimension is higher as expected from the 
low percentage of Catholics, and Belgium, Portugal, and Slovakia which exhibit a low 
saliency despite a large percentage of the population being Catholic. Nevertheless, it can 
be concluded from the above findings that there is good support for the first hypothesis  
(H1).
The  second  hypothesis  (H2)  links  the  salience  of  the  religious  dimension  to  the 
importance of religion:
H2 The saliency of religious values in determining self-placement on the left  or 
right corresponds to the overall importance of religion in a country.
To evaluate this hypothesis, I rely on data from the European Values Study (third wave, 
conducted 1999/2000). Data from this survey are available for 17 of the 21 countries 
under  study  (not  featured:  Switzerland,  Cyprus,  Israel,  and  Norway).  This  survey 
includes a question about the importance of God in the life of the respondent. The exact  
question wording is:
And how important is God in your life? Please use this card to indicate – 10 means very  
important and 1 means not at all important.
Since all countries included in this study are dominated by monotheistic beliefs, God 
and religion are concepts that are inextricably linked: There is no religion without God.  
Therefore, the mean value for each country on this 10-point-scale can serve as a proxy 
for the importance of religion. When correlating these values with the r-squares of the 
religious  dimension  (see  figure  5),  a  positive  but  rather  weak  relationship  can  be 
observed. The correlation coefficient is only 0.21, with a p-value of 0.43.
However, from figure 5 it becomes obvious that Slovenia presents a major outlier due to 
its  exceptionally  high  explained  variance.  Taking  Slovenia  out  of  the  equation,  the 
correlation coefficient strengthens to 0.41 (p-value: 0.12).
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Figure 5: Importance of God and the religious dimension












































Note: Data from EVS 1999/2000; no data available for Switzerland, Cyprus, Norway, and Israel.
Still, it must be concluded that there is only a modest relationship between the overall 
importance of religion in a country and the salience of the religious dimension. While  
the data do not suggest a complete rejection of H2, the evidence is arguably too weak to 
justify a full confirmation of the hypothesis.
4.2.2. The socio-economic dimension
The second set of hypotheses pertains to the socio-economic dimension. Drawing on the 
historical development of the class cleavage and the concept of “freezing” party systems 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967),  it  is  conjectured that the socio-economic dimension is  a  
more powerful predictor than the other two sets of value orientations:
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H3 Of  all  value  orientations  those  associated  with  the  class  cleavage  have  the 
greatest explanatory power concerning left-right self-identification in Europe.
To  test  this  hypothesis,  I  assemble  the  explained  variances  for  each  of  the  three 
dimensions  as  well  as  for  the  religious  and  the  libertarian-authoritarian  dimension 
combined.  Table  10  reports  the  exact  figures.  Grey  shaded  cells  indicate  that  the 
respective  figure  is  smaller  than  that  for  the  socio-economic  dimension  and  hence 
conforms to the hypothesis. 







Belgium 0.023 0.021 0.037 0.030
Bulgaria 0.009 0.033 0.047 0.021
Switzerland 0.023 0.104 0.103 0.107
Cyprus 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.012
Germany 0.031 0.050 0.086 0.080
Denmark 0.012 0.104 0.106 0.231
Estonia 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.035
Spain 0.077 0.065 0.097 0.014
Finland 0.059 0.040 0.081 0.136
France 0.060 0.111 0.150 0.136
United Kingdom 0.008 0.046 0.051 0.092
Hungary 0.027 0.009 0.038 0.018
Israel 0.056 0.015 0.044 0.040
Netherlands 0.021 0.071 0.092 0.100
Norway 0.010 0.081 0.084 0.189
Poland 0.067 0.016 0.069 0.002
Portugal 0.022 0.008 0.019 0.005
Russia 0.044 0.010 0.049 0.020
Sweden 0.010 0.037 0.045 0.279
Slovakia 0.018 0.003 0.051 0.103
Slovenia 0.139 0.047 0.150 0.026
Total 0.042 0.035 0.065 0.044
Note: Figures are adjusted r-squares from weighted least squares regressions (using “dweight” for single-country models and 
“pweight*dweight” for the full model).
By this account, the socio-economic dimension yields higher explained variances in 15 
out  of  21  countries  when  compared  with  the  religious  dimension,  in  16  out  of  21 
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countries when compared with the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, and in 10 out of  
21 countries the adjusted r-square even trumps that of both other dimensions combined. 
As can be easily seen from table 10, there are only four countries where the socio-
economic dimension’s explanatory power is inferior to that of both other dimensions: 
Poland, Portugal,  Spain,  and Slovenia.  In Bulgaria,  Hungary,  Israel,  and Russia,  the 
socio-economic items explain more variance than one of the other two sets of variables. 
The fact  that  the 10 states fully conforming to H3 are found mostly in Central  and 
Northern  Europe  certify  the  previous  findings  about  the  regional  diversity  of  the 
prevalence and the meaning of left and right in Europe.
Taken  together,  the  above  results  strongly  confirm the  third  hypothesis.  The  socio-
economic dimension continues to make up for a large part of the meaning of the left-
right terminology in Europe, albeit with regional variation.
This notion is picked up by the fourth hypothesis which states that the socio-economic 
dimension  is  a  weaker  predictor  of  left-right  self-placement  in  the  post-communist 
states than in the rest of Europe:
H4 While running in the same direction, the link between socio-economic values 
and  left-right  self-placement  is  weaker  in  former  communist  societies  than 
elsewhere in Europe.
Note  that  for  this  hypothesis  to  be  confirmed,  it  is  necessary  that  the  signs  of  the 
coefficients  point  into  the  same  direction.  In  order  to  evaluate  H4,  two  separate 
regression models are set up; one for the seven post-communist countries (Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia), and one for the remaining  
states. Table 11 reports the results.




Achievement Tax/Spend Adj. R2 N
Post-communist 
states
4.89 0.06 0.17 -0.03
0.010 8480
0.09** 0.02** 0.02** 0.01**
Other states 2.66 0.31 0.28 0.11 0.083 23930
0.05** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01**
Note: Weighted least squares regressions (using “dweight” for single-country models and “pweight*dweight” for the full model);  
reported values are unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in italics; ** p-value < 0,01; * p-value < 0,05 
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While  it  holds  that  all  coefficients  as  well  as  the  explained  variance  are  markedly 
greater in non-ex-communist countries, the tax/spend-item yields a negative predictor in 
the post-communist sphere. As discussed before, the question wording of this item is the 
most complex among the selected variables and also displays a very high non-response 
rate in a number of countries. For the former communist states, only 84.7 percent of all  
responses are valid as opposed to 93.9 percent for all other countries combined. While 
the  negative  sign  for  the  tax/spend-coefficient  in  table  3  is  difficult  to  explain  in  
substantial terms, there might well be artefacts resulting from the question wording that 
contribute to this outcome.
Nevertheless, the analysis in table 11 leads to the conclusion that there is only partial  
support for the fourth hypothesis.
4.2.3. The libertarian-authoritarian dimension
The final set of hypotheses is concerned with the third dimension of value orientations: 
libertarian-authoritarian beliefs. First,  it  is conjectured that such values only become  
politically salient when basic economic needs are satisfied over a longer period of time. 
Therefore, libertarian-authoritarian policies should be more relevant in societies where 
bread-and-butter issues are of less concern for a large part of the populace. Hence, the 
fifth hypothesis is:
H5 The more economically developed a country, the more powerful the libertarian- 
authoritarian dimension in explaining left-right self-identification.
A test of this hypothesis can easily be conducted by correlating the r-squares from the 
libertarian-authoritarian  regression  models  with  a  basic  measure  of  economic 
development, for example a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.
Figure 6 plots the explained variance of the libertarian-authoritarian dimension against 
national per capita GDP figures (World Bank 2009). The correlation between the two 
values is a strong 0.67, with a p-value well below 0.01.
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Figure 6: GDP per capita and the libertarian-authoritarian dimension






























































Note: GDP data from World Bank (2009), figures are per capita purchasing power parities for 2008.
The strength of the relationship is stunning: running a simple regression with GDP per 
capita  as  a  predictor  of  the  explained  variance  for  the  libertarian-authoritarian 
dimension yields an adjusted r-square of 0.43; a one thousand dollar increase in the 
GDP per capita raises the explained variance for libertarian-authoritarian items by 0.22 
percentage points.
Clearly,  the  data  presented  give  unambiguous  support  to  the  fifth  hypothesis:  the 
salience of the libertarian-authoritarian dimension is strongly related to a country’s state  
of economic development.
The  sixth  hypothesis  assumes  that  the  relationship  between  libertarian-authoritarian 
values and the left-right semantics differs between Eastern and Western Europe – or  
more precisely: post-communist and other states. H6 states:
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H6 Libertarian-authoritarian values in Eastern Europe are related to the left-right 
dimension in the reverse direction when compared with Western Europe.
Marks  et  al.  (2006)  argue  that  several  decades  of  communist  dictatorship  have 
established a link between authoritarian beliefs and the political left in large parts of  
Eastern Europe. The following regression models – one conducted for post-communist 
and  one  for  the  other  countries  –  should  therefore  yield  coefficients  pointing  into 
different directions. Table 12 presents the results:
Table 12: Libertarian-authoritarian dimension: post-communist vs. other states
Intercept Homosexuals Immigration Obedience Adj. R2 N
Post-communist states 5.68 -0.06 -0.05 0.06 0.006 8356
0.13** 0.02** 0.01** 0.03*
Other states 2.90 0.24 0.09 0.27 0.055 24568
0.06** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01**
Note: Weighted least squares regressions (using “dweight” for single-country models and “pweight*dweight” for the full model);  
reported values are unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in italics; ** p-value < 0,01; * p-value < 0,05 
With two out of three coefficients negative in the former communist states and three 
positive predictors for the rest of Europe, there is good support for H6, albeit that the 
direction of the obedience coefficient does not differ between east and west. Also, the  
explained variance for the post-communist societies is rather weak. 
As was observed in table 8, the negative coefficients for libertarian-authoritarian items  
in  Eastern  Europe  occur  predominantly  in  Bulgaria,  Estonia,  Russia,  and  Slovakia,  
whereas Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia mostly exhibit positive predictors. However, 
since all coefficients in table 12 are statistically significant, we can consider the sixth  
hypothesis to be largely confirmed.
4.3. Grouping countries: multidimensional scaling and cluster analysis
The final analytical step in this study is to group countries according to their respective 
left-right value profile, thus detecting clusters of countries where left and right have a  
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similar meaning. The starting point for the cluster analysis are the standardized (=beta) 
regression  coefficients  from the  nine-item-models  (see  table  9).  Using  standardized 
coefficients means that all variables will receive equal weight in the calculation of the  
distance matrix which then serves as the input for the clustering procedure. Table 13 
presents the beta coefficients for the nine items per country.
















Belgium 0.101 0.106 -0.082 0.065 0.078 0.096 0.042 0.031 0.086
Bulgaria 0.010 0.127 -0.005 0.103 0.052 0.018 -0.141 -0.046 -0.024
Switzerland 0.034 0.040 0.048 0.136 0.160 0.161 0.110 0.192 0.095
Cyprus -0.066 0.146 0.006 0.112 0.022 0.075 0.008 -0.076 0.023
Germany 0.110 0.057 0.003 0.159 0.124 0.111 0.132 0.122 0.071
Denmark 0.090 -0.029 0.029 0.194 0.170 0.223 0.033 0.128 0.122
Estonia -0.016 0.032 -0.064 0.145 -0.001 0.078 -0.066 -0.005 -0.006
Spain 0.188 0.072 -0.019 0.084 0.017 -0.027 0.088 0.113 0.085
Finland 0.208 -0.008 0.044 0.242 0.149 0.110 0.063 -0.030 0.079
France 0.096 0.123 0.012 0.190 0.169 0.083 -0.002 0.204 0.116
United Kingdom 0.107 -0.049 0.014 0.168 0.120 0.103 0.037 0.062 0.116
Hungary 0.147 0.107 -0.116 -0.102 -0.033 0.088 0.113 0.006 -0.053
Israel 0.138 0.018 0.118 0.024 0.223 0.056 -0.033 -0.044 0.006
Netherlands 0.086 0.061 -0.039 0.225 0.104 0.074 0.115 0.166 0.125
Norway 0.046 0.013 0.007 0.202 0.163 0.177 0.060 0.104 0.127
Poland 0.131 0.118 0.028 0.036 0.072 0.001 0.039 -0.003 0.022
Portugal 0.033 0.008 0.116 0.062 0.034 -0.017 0.031 -0.050 -0.009
Russia 0.183 0.041 -0.020 0.043 0.080 -0.089 -0.114 -0.040 0.025
Sweden 0.106 0.027 -0.046 0.224 0.211 0.240 0.032 0.019 0.095
Slovenia 0.140 0.189 -0.154 0.181 0.061 0.197 -0.088 -0.012 -0.048
Slovakia 0.107 0.224 0.040 0.062 0.005 0.123 0.121 0.053 -0.012
Note: Figures are standardized regression coefficients from weighted least squares regressions.
Standardized coefficients allow for comparison across variables and countries. It can 
therefore be concluded from table 13 that the strongest predictor in a single country is 
the income equality item in Finland (0.242). This variable yields beta values larger than 
0.2 in a number of countries, as do the other items the socio-economic dimension.
For the religious dimension, attendance in Slovenia produces a beta coefficient of 0.224; 
the  highest  standardized  coefficient  for  the  libertarian-authoritarian  dimension  is  
immigration in France (0.204).
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When conducting a cluster analysis two important choices have to be made: first,  a 
measure  of  either  distance  or  similarity  has  to  be  selected;  second,  a  clustering 
algorithm suitable to the research task at hand must be chosen.
As to the first decision, it must be taken into consideration on what grounds clusters 
should be formed in the later process. A measure of similarity, for instance correlation 
coefficients, would group together two countries whose nine beta values display a high 
correlation – irrespective of whether the beta values for the two countries are close 
together in absolute terms. Yet, since the information carried by the absolute values of 
the standardized coefficients – high or low, positive or negative – should not be lost 
when transforming the values in table 13, the appropriate choice for the task at hand is a 
measure of distance rather than one of similarity.
Table 14: Country-by-country distance matrix
BE BG CH CY DE DK EE ES FI FR UK HU IL NL NO PL PT RU SE SI
BG 74
CH 73 178
CY 60 36 137
DE 38 144 18 109
DK 83 178 27 158 37
EE 54 29 128 33 99 120
ES 41 128 94 128 45 125 106
FI 81 150 99 143 51 58 121 93
FR 66 135 34 142 35 50 120 76 95
UK 48 120 43 110 26 23 74 63 30 55
HU 69 153 200 134 141 242 131 94 216 226 177
IL 91 93 128 122 106 120 125 123 82 130 78 172
NL 56 165 31 132 14 48 108 54 74 27 37 195 165
NO 60 148 19 115 22 8 95 104 55 38 19 218 116 28
PL 28 57 108 60 61 134 72 34 87 95 72 70 51 97 109
PT 84 62 134 54 101 155 64 86 107 154 80 131 59 141 129 35
RU 83 56 213 125 151 203 91 78 125 155 111 140 70 176 185 44 72
SE 72 159 67 137 53 24 113 150 45 76 42 231 118 70 22 132 172 195
SI 51 114 101 73 64 150 110 70 136 110 124 73 137 103 122 43 97 159 149
SK 74 86 189 109 135 159 79 160 141 139 146 150 181 154 142 118 195 150 101 112
Note: Figures are squared Euclidean distances between countries based on standardized regression coefficients, multiplied by 
1000.
A  number  of  distance  measures  are  available  (such  as  Euclidean  distances,  the 
Manhattan metric, or the Minkowski metric1) of which the most apt appears to be the 
1 Euclidean distance: ∑√(x1 – x2)2; Manhattan: ∑|x1 – x2|; Minkowski: ∑√(|x1 – x2|p)1/p.
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squared Euclidean distance. This measure puts more weight on larger differences than 
on smaller ones an can therefore be expected to produce useful results.
Table  14  shows  the  distance  matrix  obtained  from  the  standardized  regression 
coefficients. The figures can be interpreted as the squared Euclidean distances between 
countries in a nine-dimensional space where each dimension corresponds to one of the 
nine variables used in the regression analyses. Low numbers indicate that two countries 
are similar cases, high numbers point to large differences in the meaning of left and 
right.
Denmark provides are very clear example of how to interpret the figures in table 14: it 
displays comparatively low distances to countries like Norway (8), the United Kingdom 
(23),  or  Sweden (24),  whereas  Hungary  (242),  Russia  (203),  or  Slovakia  (159)  are 
located far from Denmark in the Euclidean space. Hence, we would expect Denmark to 
end up in a cluster with the former set of countries rather than with the latter one. Given 
that  Denmark  is  likely  to  be  more  similar  to  other  Scandinavian  countries  and the  
United Kingdom than to states in the post-communist sphere, these are very plausible 
results.
Plotting the distances into a two-dimensional graph by means of a multidimensional 
scaling algorithm (R’s cmdscale) yields the scatterplot shown in figure 7:
Figure 7 largely confirms the observations from table 14. Using again the example of  
Denmark, the distances to countries like Sweden, Norway, or the United Kingdom are 
much smaller than those to Hungary, Russia, or Slovenia.
What  is  more,  figure  7  presents  a  first  overview of  similarities  and  differences  of  
countries  across  Europe.  Quite  obviously,  all  West  European  countries  with  the 
exception of Belgium are found in the left half of the plot, whereas the right half is 
made up of the seven post-communist states, the countries on the Iberian Peninsula,  
Israel, Cyprus and Belgium. While the horizontal axis in figure 7 evidently maps an 
east-west divide within Europe, the vertical axis is somewhat more difficult to interpret.  
It shows, however, that the variation within the two main groups – located on either side  
of  the  horizontal  axis  –  differs  markedly:  the  West  European  countries  on  the  left 
constitute a much more homogeneous cluster compared with the remaining countries on 
the right.
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Figure 7: Multidimensional scaling of countries
































Note: MDS based on squared Euclidean distances shown in table 14, goodness of fit: 0.63.
To complete the analysis, an algorithm for clustering needs to be chosen. Here, I rely on 
the Ward method which produces groups “producing the least impairment of the optimal 
value of the objective function” (Ward 1963: 238). In other words, the Ward algorithm 
starts out with all elements (here: countries) representing a single cluster. Subsequently, 
those  elements  are  merged into  a  new cluster  by  which  the  “objective  function”  is 
increased the least. The objective function used by Ward is a measure for the “loss of 












The  Ward  algorithm differs  from other  clustering  methods  (such  as  single  linkage, 
average linkage, complete linkage) in that it uses this objective function to define sets of  
clusters. As to the performance of the Ward algorithm, Blashfield (1976: 385) concluded 
that this method “is generally preferable” to the three methods mentioned above. In  
71
another test of different algorithms, Mojena (1977: 361) came to the result that the Ward 
method “gave a superior performance across all data sets”.
Given these findings and the fact that groups of countries with maximal homogeneity 
are desirable outcomes in this study, the Ward algorithm can be considered a reasonable 
choice.
Figure 8 presents the dendrogram resulting from the cluster analysis. Most clearly, a 
two-cluster-solution emerges,  with both clusters  consisting of two respectively three  
sub-clusters. The two-cluster-solution represents the divide between the Northern and 
Western European countries and the other countries in the data set, that is, the post-
communist  states plus those countries bordering the Mediterranean (Spain,  Portugal, 
Cyprus, Israel), as well as Belgium – an outlier from the pattern discovered in the rest of  
Western Europe.
The following section discusses in a more detailed fashion the groups (sub-clusters) of 
countries  emerging from the cluster analysis.
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Figure 8: Dendrogram of clustered countries
Note: Cluster analysis based on standardized regression coefficients using squared Euclidean distances and Ward algorithm.
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4.4. Discussion of results: identifying cross-national commonalities in sub-clusters
The cluster algorithm applied (R’s hclust routine) places more homogeneous groupings 
at the top and more heterogeneous groupings towards the bottom of the dendrogram. We 
can therefore conclude that, concerning the meaning of left and right, the Northern and  
Western European states are not only distinct from the other countries, they also display 
a more uniform pattern across the three dimensions.
The  first  sub-cluster  within  the  top  branch  of  the  dendrogram  consists  of  four 
democracies in Western Europe (France, Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands).  
Judging by the regression analyses presented above, these are the countries most clearly 
displaying a three-dimensional account of left and right. Religious, socio-economic, and 
libertarian-authoritarian variables have a  considerable  impact  on individual  left-right  
self-placement in those states – a finding that is hardly surprising given the history and 
the socio-demographics of these societies. 
As to the religious dimension, it  should be noted that, in three of the four countries  
(Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands), there is a long-established split between Roman 
Catholics  and Protestants,  with  both denominations  accounting for  a  similarly  sized 
proportion of the populace (Cipriani 2009: 114). The denominational cleavage – most 
profoundly established in the verzuiling of the Dutch society (Rokkan 1977) – fostered 
the politicization of religious issues. Even today, we find parties heavily campaigning 
on  a  religious  agenda,  such  as  the Staatkundig  Gereformeerde  Partij and  the 
ChristenUnie in  the  Netherlands,  or  the Evangelische  Volkspartei and  the 
Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union in Switzerland. In Germany, however, the divide 
between  Catholics  and  Protestants  was  mitigated  by  the  foundation  of  the  supra-
denominational  Christian  Democratic  Union  after  the  Second  World  War  (Pridham 
1977: 26). Still, religious attitudes are by all accounts relevant in determining political  
orientations in Germany. France, the fourth country in the first sub-cluster, can hardly 
said to be denominationally mixed. Still, as Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 15) argue, the 
French Revolution  “produced the  deepest  and  bitterest  opposition  […] between the 
aspirations of the the mobilizing nation state and the corporate claims of the churches”. 
As the much of the conflict in the post-revolutionary French National Assembly – where 
the terms left and right were first used in a political context – was about the role of the 
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Catholic church (Laponce 1981),  it  is unsurprising that the religious items are good 
predictors of left-right self-placement in France and hence allocate the country with the 
denominationally mixed countries in the cluster dendrogram.
The socio-economic cleavage impacted quite uniformly on many parts of Europe, and 
the four countries in the top sub-cluster are no exception to this rule. The coefficients 
for the three respective variables are – as expected – positive, highly significant, and of  
very  similar  size  in  France,  Switzerland,  Germany and the  Netherlands.  In  all  four 
countries, the variance explained by the socio-economic items surpasses that explained 
by the other dimensions, if only by a small margin in Switzerland. However, the socio-
economic dimension is not the one distinguishing the first sub-cluster from the second. 
Instead, the socio-economic dimension accounts for most of the major divide between 
the northwest of Europe and the other countries in the analysis. The differences between  
the first and second sub-cluster stem from the variation in the strength of the religious 
and the libertarian-authoritarian dimension.
With respect to the latter, the four countries in the first sub-cluster display the strongest 
effect,  only  a  little  short  of  the  socio-economic  dimension.  This  is  in  line  with 
Inglehart’s (1971, 1977) hypothesis of value change as a result of continued prosperity 
and affluence in post-war Europe. Moreover, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands  have  experienced most  profound transformations  of  their  party  systems 
through the increased salience of the libertarian-authoritarian cleavage (Kitschelt 1988, 
1995), with parties emerging on the libertarian left (Green parties in all four countries  
plus Democraten 66 in the Netherlands) and on the authoritarian right (Front National 
in  France; Republikaner,  DVU,  and  NPD  in  Germany;  SVP in  Switzerland;  Pim 
Fortuyn’s List and Geert Wilders’ PVV in the Netherlands). Hence, the relevance of the 
libertarian-authoritarian  dimension  in  explaining  left-right  self-placement  is  hardly 
surprising.
The second sub-cluster consists of all Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Norway, and 
Denmark) and the United Kingdom. Interestingly, these five countries are also put in 
one category by Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 38–41).
First of all, these are societies dominated by Protestant majorities and therefore lack a  
history of severe conflict between nation builders and church authorities. While we find  
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religious parties in  all  Scandinavian countries,  the religious cleavage seems to  have 
impacted on left-right self-identification to a greater extent only in Finland. Since it is  
the religiosity item that largely drives the strength of the religious dimension there, we 
can assume that the Finnish society is less secularized than other societies in Northern 
Europe.  We  find  this  assumption  confirmed  by  the  data  from  a  2005  Special 
Eurobarometer (European Commission 2005: 9): subtracting the percentage of atheists 
(“I don’t believe there is any sort of spirit, God or life force”) from the believers in God  
(“I believe there is a God”) we obtain a value of +25 for Finland, +18 for the United 
Kingdom,  +12  for  Denmark,  and  ±0  for  Sweden  (no  data  available  for  Norway). 
Therefore,  we  can  hold  that  Finland  is  still  a  more  religious  country  than  its 
Scandinavian neighbours. With respect to the United Kingdom, it can be assumed that 
its party and electoral systems discourage religious mobilization.
The socio-economic dimension is by a large margin the most relevant and most salient 
in the countries of Northern Europe. Yet historically, the industrial conflict had a quite 
different effect: it brought to the fore the social democratic welfare state in Scandinavia, 
while leading to the establishment of a more liberal regime of industrial relations in the  
United Kingdom. Accordingly,  it  is  especially the Scandinavian countries where the 
socio-economic  dimension  of  the  left-right  dichotomy  prevails  over  all  other 
dimensions by a large margin.
As the North of Europe is one of the most affluent and secure regions in the world, we 
can observe a considerable effect of the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, albeit to a 
smaller extent than in the Western European states assembled in the first sub-cluster.  
The effect is most pronounced in Denmark, which is not only the most “continental” 
state  within  the  second  sub-cluster,  but  also  one  where  the  libertarian-authoritarian 
cleavage has impacted strongly on the electorate and hence the national party system 
(Stubager 2006). Sweden, Finland, and the United Kingdom display a lower salience of 
the  libertarian-authoritarian  dimension  of  left-right,  which  is,  inter  alia,  due  to  the  
relatively  weak  link  between  attitudes  towards  immigrants  and  the  left-right 
terminology (see table 8). The absence of a significant anti-immigrant party in these  
countries (as opposed to Denmark and Norway) arguably accounts for this feature.
76
Overall,  we  can  conclude  from looking  at  the  top  half  of  the  dendrogram that  the  
societies of Northern and Western Europe exhibit a similar account of the meaning of 
left  and  right.  Variation  is  mostly  due  to  the  differences  in  denominational 
characteristics between the Protestant North of Britain and the Scandinavian countries 
and the  mixed-belief  societies  of  continental  Western Europe  (with Catholic  France  
constituting  a  somewhat  special  case).  Some  indication  for  a  weaker  libertarian-
authoritarian dimension in parts of Northern Europe has also been found.
Devoting our attention to the lower half of the dendrogram, a few characteristics stand 
out at first glance. First, there is much greater heterogeneity in the branch itself as well 
as in its sub-clusters. Second, although some intuitive patterns can be detected from the 
three (or four, if Slovakia is counted as a separate singleton) sub-clusters that emerge in 
the dendrogram, there is no geographical or denominational logic to be found that is as 
convincing as was the case in the top half of the clustering tree. Third, cross-checking 
the dendrogram with the overall variance explained by the nine issue items (see table 9), 
it  must  be  concluded  that  the  link  between  the  left-right  terminology  and  certain  
political issues is a lot weaker in the post-communist states and the remaining countries 
of Southern and Eastern Europe than in the north and west of the continent. In the words 
of  Inglehart  and  Klingemann  (1976),  the  value  component  of  left-right  self-
identification in those societies is extremely modest. Two possible conclusions can be 
drawn from this finding: the weak value component either indicates that the meaning of 
left  and  right  in  the  respective  countries  is  mostly  determined  by  the  other  two 
components (socio-structural and partisan), or it reflects a lower relevance of the left-
right dimension in general.
In order to fully assess both possibilities, the weight of the other two components would 
have to be determined – a task that goes beyond the scope of this study. However, there 
is  some  indication  that  the  weaker  showing  of  the  nine  items  in  the  Eastern  and 
Southern European countries reflects a more general limitation in the use of the left-
right dimension.
First, drawing on an argument made by Fuchs and Klingemann (1990), the fact that the 
response rates for the left-right item are consistently lower in the countries found in the 
bottom half of the cluster tree suggests a limited acquaintance with the concept of left 
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and right as political labels. Also, the share of respondents placing themselves in the 
middle category can serve as a rough proxy of respondents’ familiarity with the left-
right concept, since respondents who are unsure about the meaning of the terms left and 
right  are  more likely to  choose the middle category.  Especially  the post-communist  
countries display a higher share of such responses (36.9 % on average versus 28.9 % for 
the other country samples), thus supporting the argument of limited prevalence of left 
and right in these societies.
Second, it  should be noted that most countries in the lower cluster are considerably 
young  democracies.  Party  competition  is,  therefore,  a  comparatively  recent 
phenomenon in most of these states. Thus, the likelihood of a strong partisan component 
– which requires a certain degree of stability in the national party system over a longer  
period of time – appears to be limited. Again, this argument applies mostly to the post-
communist  countries,  since  Freire  (2006:  368;  2008:  192)  shows  that  partisan 
orientations  are  central  in  explaining  left-right  orientations  in  Portugal,  Spain,  and 
Belgium.
The first  sub-cluster  in the lower branch of the cluster  tree is  comprised of Russia, 
Israel, and Portugal. There are hardly any obvious commonalities linking these three 
countries:  geographically,  these  countries  lie  on  (or  even  beyond)  the  edges  of  the 
European continent. Also, their political systems and denominational characteristics are 
far from uniform.
Still, it can be seen from figure 1 that the religious dimension is the most important one 
in explaining left-right self-placement for all three cases. It is well-known that religious 
issues feature prominently in the Israeli political arena, and provide numerous (smaller) 
parties with a competitive electoral platform (Cohen 2007). In the case of Russia, the  
relative importance of the religious dimension is more surprising, especially given the 
limited role of religion after decades of communist rule (Kääriäinen 1999).
Portugal is one of the countries with the lowest explained variance across all three value 
dimensions.  This  result  is  in  line  with  Freire  (2006:  368)  who  found  a  maximum 
explained variance of three percent for the value component in Portugal. In contrast,  
socio-structural and partisan variables accounted for almost a third of the variation in 
left-right self-placement.
78
The  libertarian-authoritarian  dimension  is  close  to  irrelevant  in  the  three  countries  
forming the top sub-cluster of the lower branch.  Following Inglehart’s (1971, 1977) 
concept  of  value  change,  the  comparatively  modest  economic  status  of  the  three 
countries accounts for this finding.
Still, Israel, Russia, and Portugal are too diverse a bunch of countries to make intuitive  
sense as a distinct group. It should therefore be concluded that the similarities observed 
in  the  above  analysis  are  most  likely  (accidental)  outcomes  of  country-specific 
developments rather than the result of a general societal or political pattern found in all 
three states.
Quite to the contrary, the second sub-cluster in the bottom half of the dendrogram is 
made  up  of  countries  that  are  more  easily  identified  as  a  group  with  significant 
commonalities.  As  was  the  case  for  Western  and  Northern  Europe,  religious 
denomination is a key variable here. Hungary, Slovenia, Spain, Belgium, and Poland are  
countries with large Catholic majorities. Accordingly, the religious dimension explains 
the largest share of left-right variance in these countries (except for Belgium where all 
three value dimensions are similarly weak). Connected to the Catholic tradition of the 
five  countries  is  a  historical  link.  The  Habsburg  Empire  comprised  parts  of  the 
territories  on which we find the  five  states  today.  While  this  feature  should not  be 
overestimated in itself, the struggles of the Rome-oriented Habsburg emperors against 
Protestant dissidents in the course of the Counter-Reformation surely helped to lay the 
groundwork for a politicization of the religious cleavage.
The socio-economic dimension is hardly relevant in the five countries of the Catholic  
sub-cluster.  In  Slovenia,  Poland,  and  Hungary,  the  absence  of  political  competition 
during decades of communist rule in the second half of the twentieth century hindered  
the materialization of the class cleavage in the countries’ political systems. A similar 
development seems to have taken place in Spain, where the value component of the  
socio-economic dimension is clearly weaker than the partisan or the socio-structural 
component (Freire 2006: 368).
Concerning  the  socio-economic  but  also  the  libertarian-authoritarian  dimension,  the 
results for Belgium are most stunning. The country represents a major outlier among the 
Western European nations that typically exhibit a high salience of the industrial as well 
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as  the  post-industrial  conflict  line.  The  most  obvious  explanation is  that  the  ethno-
linguistic divide between Flanders and Wallonia has become so central an element of  
Belgian politics that other cleavages have become less salient. Examining the figures in 
table  9,  Belgians  differ  from  their  Dutch  and  French  neighbours  particularly  with  
respect  to  the  immigration  issue  which  completely  fails  to  predict  left-right  self-
placement in Belgium – an unexpected outcome given that Flanders is home to one of 
the most successful radical right-wing parties in Europe, the Vlaams Belang.
Whereas  the  libertarian-authoritarian  value  dimension  remains  weak  in  Belgium, 
Poland, and Hungary, there are some moderate effects in Spain and Slovenia. While in 
the  latter  case  the  homosexuals  issue  –  and  hence  possibly  underlying  religious 
orientations – mostly determines the stronger showing of the libertarian-authoritarian 
dimension,  respondents  in  Spain clearly  link their  left-right  self-placement  to  all  of  
these non-economic issues.
Summing up, the left-right dimension in the five countries of the second sub-cluster in 
the lower branch of the dendrogram is most evidently influenced by religious attitudes,  
with  “New  Politics”-issues  playing  a  minor  role  in  Spain.  The  socio-economic 
dimension is more or less negligible.
The sub-cluster at  the very bottom of the dendrogram consists of Bulgaria, Estonia,  
Cyprus, and Slovakia, albeit that the latter is clearly an outlier within this group. Again, 
there is no obvious commonality linking the four countries: three are post-communist 
states, one (Cyprus) is not; Cyprus and Bulgaria are mostly Orthodox, while Slovakia is 
Catholic and Estonia largely atheist  – only 31.8 % of the population specified their 
religious  affiliation  in  the  2000  census  (Statistical  Office  of  Estonia  2002:  30);  a 
possible  commonality  is  that  all  four  countries  experienced  conflict  over  national 
identity  to  some  degree.  Estonia  and  Bulgaria  have  large  ethnic  and  linguistic 
minorities, which is true also for Slovakia that became a sovereign state only in 1993 
after  the peaceful separation from the Czech Republic;  finally,  the division between 
Turkish  and  Greek  Cypriots  has  been  dominating  the  island’s  political  agenda  for 
decades. As Horowitz (1985: 32) notes, ethnic struggle can prevent class conflict from 
becoming salient in societies where both cleavages do not reinforce each other. This  
argument  might  partly  explain  why the  three  value  dimensions  explain  little  of  the 
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variance of the left-right dimension in the four countries in question (Slovakia being an  
exception due to the strong impact of the socio-economic dimension).
The case of Cyprus – the country with the lowest overall explained variance (see table 
9) – is perhaps most surprising since voters’ perceptions of the Cypriot political parties 
are very clear-cut (Freire et al. 2006: 14). Still, with the exception of socio-economic 
policies, party competition in Cyprus is low in most policy areas (Benoit and Laver  
2006: 255).
Interestingly,  the  four  countries  display  a  somewhat  similar  profile  of  libertarian-
authoritarian values – at least to the extent that it influences left-right self-identification  
at all. For all four countries, most signs of the respective coefficients are negative (see 
table  9).  Most  notably,  positive  attitudes  towards  homosexuals  are  significantly 
correlated with self-placements on the right in Bulgaria, Estonia, and Slovakia – the  
three post-communist countries in the lowermost sub-cluster.
From a  more  general  perspective  on  the  21  countries  included  in  the  analysis,  the 
dendrogram reveals specific commonalities in the meaning of the left-right terminology 
across European electorates. A number of findings stand out:
First, the major line of distinction is the one separating Western and Northern Europe 
from the Southern and Eastern parts of the continent, as illustrated in figure 8 by the two 
major  branches  of  the  clustering  tree.  In  the  Northwest,  we find  not  only  a  higher 
prevalence  of  the  left-right  dimension  in  general,  also  the  socio-economic  and 
libertarian-authoritarian dimensions are clearly more well-established. The strength of  
the religious dimension varies across and within the two major groups of countries, with  
the mixed belief societies of Western Europe and the Catholic countries in the south and 
east displaying the highest explained variances.
Second, the picture emerging from the analysis shows that the terms left and right are 
not  only  more  common to  respondents  in  Northern  and Western  Europe,  also  their 
meaning is  more homogeneous across countries in these areas.  While the Protestant 
North displays a left-right account with hardly any impact of religious variables, the 
mixed belief and Catholic societies of Western Europe – most prominently France –  
exhibit a more multifaceted meaning of left and right: here, religious, socio-economic, 
as  well  as  libertarian-authoritarian  value  orientations  contribute  strongly  and 
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significantly to the explanation of variation in individuals’ left-right self-placement. The  
Western  European  countries,  therefore,  come  closest  of  all  subgroups  to  Knutsen’s 
(1995; 1998; 2002) three-dimensional approach to the meaning of left and right.
Third,  we  can  conclude  that  the  left-right  dimension  is  not  only  less  common and  
prevalent  in  the  Eastern and Southern European countries,  also it’s  meaning is  less  
stable  and  more  prone  to  variation.  Therefore,  these  countries  present  a  much  less 
homogeneous account of the meaning of left and right. However, it is noteworthy that 
the religious dimension is  comparatively strong in the Catholic countries of Eastern 
Europe and the Mediterranean area as well as in Russia and, of course, Israel. With a  
few exceptions, the other two value dimensions do not add to the understanding of left  
and right in Southern and Eastern Europe: the socio-economic dimension is consistently 
weaker  than  in  the  Northern  and  Western  parts  of  Europe,  except  for  the  case  of 
Slovakia; the libertarian-authoritarian dimension is of equally little relevance, with only 
Spain and Slovenia displaying a moderate effect.
What are the implications of these results? Arian and Shamir (1983) argued that the 
terms left and right are not extracts of individuals’ ideological views but rather political 
labels that people attribute to certain objects, most notably political parties. We cannot 
fully  test  this  assumption here,  since this  would require  accounting for  the partisan 
component of the left-right dimension (as done by Freire 2006, 2008). Yet, the results 
indicate that there are political systems where a substantive share of the electorate links  
their  own  attitudes  towards  religious,  socio-economic,  and  libertarian-authoritarian 
issues to the concepts of left and right in a meaningful way.
To be sure,  this  relationship is  most  certainly mediated by political  parties,  but  the  
analysis presented shows that a strong link between left-right self-placement and an 
individual’s value orientations exists also if party affiliation is not considered. It can 
only by speculated here about the extent to which party affiliation explains left-right  
self-placement in countries where value orientations account only for a small share of 
the variance in the dependent variable. Results presented by Freire (2006;  2008) as well 
as Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) suggest that the partisan component is the strongest  
predictor of left-right orientations.
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However,  as  Knutsen  (1997)  shows,  the  question  is  one  of  the  causal  order:  do 
individual  value  orientations  precede  party  choice  or  does  party  choice  influence 
individuals value orientations? Arguably, either of the two competing theoretical models 
has its justifications,  yet they yield significantly different outcomes (Knutsen 1997: 
212–216). While this question cannot be solved here, it  appears safe to assume that  
there is a more complex bi-directional relationship between party choice and individual  
value orientations. Consequently, the results presented here are conceivably more than 
just  reflections  of  individuals’ partisan  preferences  that  would  disappear  once  the 
respective variables are introduced into the regression models.  Hence, the outcomes 
from the analysis can be considered valid indications of the meaning of left and right  
across the 21 countries in the data set.
The  purpose  of  the  concluding  section  is,  therefore,  to  discuss  the  variation  in  the  
salience and meaning of the left-right dimension found across Europe.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
Looking at the results of the above analysis, we can conclude that there are two types of 
variation characterising the  left-right  dimension in  the  21 European countries  under  
observation:  variation  in  strength  or  salience,  and  variation  in  the  actual  content  
associated with the left-right terminology.
5.1. The varying salience of the left-right dimension
It  is  one of  the most  obvious results  of  this  study that  the left-right  concept  is  not 
equally  well-connected  to  individuals’ value  orientations  across  European  societies. 
Based on cross-national variation in explained variances and response rates as well as 
previous  findings  in  the  literature  (Inglehart  and  Klingemann  1976;  Knutsen  1997; 
Freire 2006, 2008), I conclude that, on the one hand, this is due to a strong partisan 
component of the left-right schema which dominates the value component in a number 
of countries (e. g. Portugal), but on the other hand, reflects a general variation in the  
familiarity of the left-right concept.
Most generally, it can be held that the post-communist societies of Central and Eastern 
Europe as well as some of the younger democracies in the South of the continent exhibit 
a  rather  modest  degree  of  acquaintance  with  the  value  component  of  the  left-right  
terminology  among  respondents  (cf.  Badescu  and  Sum  2005).  This  connects  to 
Laponce’s (1975, 1981) argument about the non-hierarchical structure of the dichotomy 
of  left  and  right.  Clearly,  such  a  non-hierarchical  heuristic  lends  itself  to  denoting  
competition between equals rather than struggle within an ordered hierarchy. Hence, the 
left-right terminology is of much more use in a competitive and democratic political 
system than under dictatorships of any kind. It is therefore hardly surprising that the 
left-right dimension is most well-established in the older democracies of Northern and 
Western Europe.
Another reason for the divergence in the salience of the left-right dimension can be  
found in variation concerning conflicts about national identity, ethnic, linguistic, and  
territorial matters (Horowitz 1985). Whereas the terms left and right have, through the 
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course  of  centuries,  absorbed  meanings  relating  to  religious,  industrial,  and  post-
industrial  cleavages,  ethnic  conflict  –  particularly  when it  cuts  across other lines of 
conflict  –  tends  to  de-emphasize  the  prevalence  and  familiarity  of  the  left-right  
dimension.
The variation in the salience of the left-right schema hence reflects major historical and  
political developments in Europe. With the proper analytical tools at work, the state of  
the  left-right  dimension  can  be  considered  a  reflection  of  a  country’s  history  of 
democratization and the social conflicts present in the past centuries.
5.2. The varying meaning of the left-right dimension
Three  dimensions  of  value  orientations  have  been  hypothesized  to  influence 
individuals’ left-right self-identification. Clearly, the contribution of each dimension in 
explaining variation in  the dependent  variable  is  substantial.  But  not  only are  there 
major cross-national differences in the issue orientations associated by respondents with 
those three dimensions, the analysis also shows that many of these differences occur in 
a systematic and theoretically explicable manner.
First, the religious dimension varies with the denominational characteristics of a society.  
As was assumed on the basis of Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) account of party system 
development, the role of the Catholic church is crucial in explaining the salience of the 
religious dimension. Wherever Catholics constitute a majority or a substantial minority 
of the populace, religious attitudes and practices correlate with individuals’ left-right 
self-identification.  Interestingly,  the  pre-industrial  religious-secular  cleavage  even 
translates  into  a  strong showing of  the  religious  dimension  of  left-right  in  younger 
democracies such as Poland, Slovenia, Spain, or Russia. The variation in the religious 
dimension also cuts across the more general “the west versus the rest”-divide observed 
in the analysis. Within the group of established democracies in Northern and Western 
Europe, it distinguishes between the Protestant societies of Scandinavia and the United 
Kingdom, and the mixed belief and Catholic societies of Western Europe. Within the 
Southern  and  Eastern  European  countries,  a  distinct  subgroup  of  post-Habsburg 
Catholic societies can be identified on the basis of religious value orientations. Hence, 
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we can conclude that Knutsen’s (1995, 1997, 1998, 2002) argument for the inclusion of 
the religious dimension of the left-right schema is not only valid but also adds analytical  
insight to the study of cross-national variation in the left-right dimension.
The socio-economic dimension is still at the heart of the left-right terminology. Issues 
related to economic equality, taxation, and public services still prove to be among the 
best predictors of left-right self-placement. This is especially true for the welfare states 
of Scandinavia, where, as a consequence of social democratic dominance, such policy 
issues have been at the top of the political agenda for most of the post-war era. But also 
West European societies display a very high salience for socio-economic issues as left-
right predictors. As the testing of hypothesis three (H3) showed, the socio-economic 
dimension can still  be regarded as the most  essential  facet  of the left-right  schema. 
Wherever the socio-economic dimension is weak, this reflects a generally low salience 
of left and right (exceptions: Slovenia and Spain). Also, it is most interesting to find a 
positive  correlation  between the  explained  variances  of  the  socio-economic  and the 
libertarian-authoritarian  dimension.  While  the  analysis  here  admittedly  lacks  a 
longitudinal perspective, it can be argued that the strengths of these two dimensions are 
mutually reinforcing (see section 4.1.3.), which provides support for the pluralization 
theory  of  left  and  right  (Kitschelt  and  Hellemans  1990;  Knutsen  1995).  New non-
economic issues are not replacing or substituting the socio-economic dimension of the 
left-right  concept.  Rather,  they add to  the meaning of  left  and right.  The continued 
relevance of the religious dimension further corroborates the reasoning of pluralization 
theory.
Still, it must be concluded that Inglehart’s (1971, 1977, 1984) assertion about a change 
in the meaning of left and right was at least partially accurate. While, contrary to his  
assumptions,   materialist  issues  have  not  lost  their  significance,  the  libertarian-
authoritarian issue dimension clearly makes up a large proportion of the meaning of left  
and right, albeit that this development is – in line with Inglehart’s argument – limited to 
the economically more prosperous societies in Europe. Especially in Western European 
countries such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, or Germany, but also in Norway and 
Denmark,  we can observe a  substantial  impact  made on the left-right  dimension by 
issues such as homosexual rights,  immigration,  and obedience in the school system. 
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Interestingly, this linkage is not just a consequence of enhanced prosperity and security 
in post-war Europe, it is also mediated by the political system that is in place. Therefore, 
we  find  in  a  number  of  post-communist  countries  an  inverse  relationship  between 
libertarian-authoritarian  values  and  left-right  self-placement.  This  constitutes  a  
replication of the party system-related findings by Marks et al. (2006) at the individual 
level, albeit that the relationship is limited to a few – mostly non-Catholic – countries  
(Bulgaria, Estonia, Russia, and Slovakia).
One of the most noteworthy outcomes of this study is the diversity in the meaning of 
left and right that is observed across Europe. We find countries with an almost purely 
socio-economic (Sweden), and such with a predominantly religious account (Poland) of 
the  left-right  dimension.  Also,  there  are  societies  where  the  libertarian-authoritarian 
dimension constitutes a major proportion of the meaning of left and right, mostly in  
addition to a strong socio-economic dimension (Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
United Kingdom). In some countries, a three-dimensional account most aptly describes 
the value orientations associated with left and right (France, Finland). Finally, there are 
a few countries lacking a strong socio-economic dimension while displaying a strong 
relationship between left-right  and libertarian-authoritarian value orientations (Spain,  
Slovenia).
What  are  the  implications  of  these  findings  for  the  communication  and  orientation 
function of the left-right dimension as described by Fuchs and Klingemann (1990) or 
Arian and Shamir (1983)? Most notably, the left-right dimension appears to make sense 
primarily in the specific national contexts that individuals find themselves in. Cross-
national comparison is clearly hampered by the great variation in value orientations that  
are  associated  with  the  left-right  dimension.  While  party  and  party  system 
characteristics are more easily compared across national borders by means of the left-
right dimension (Inglehart and Huber 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006), there are many 
caveats  as  to  the  cross-national  use  of  left-right  as  an ideological  dimension at  the  
individual level. At best,  such a function can be ascribed to the terms left and right 
within a limited geographical context, most likely Northern and Western Europe, where 
there are sufficient commonalities in the understanding of the value component of the 
left-right  dimension.  It  should,  however,  not  be  assumed  that  individuals  placing 
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themselves similarly along the left-right continuum share too many ideological views  
when comparing Denmark with Russia, France with Cyprus, or Israel  with Sweden.  
Especially Eastern Europe displays not only a pattern of value orientations that differs 
largely  from  that  in  Western  and  Northern  Europe,  also  there  is  considerable 
heterogeneity within the societies of the former communist bloc.
Therefore, the application of spatial models of electoral competition to these countries, 
with left-right self-placement as an important (or even the only) determinant of vote  
choice (Downs 1957), seems problematic. While it cannot be fully assessed on the basis  
of the present analysis to what extent individuals in the countries of post-communist 
Europe  are  ideological  in  the  sense  of  holding  consistent  or  interrelated  value 
orientations (Gerring 1997; Sartori 1969), it  can nevertheless be argued that,  even if 
ideology can be found amongst the Eastern European electorates, it has not (yet) been 
absorbed by the left-right terminology to an extent comparable to that in Northern and  
Western  Europe.  This  is  especially  true  for  the  socio-economic  and  the  libertarian-
authoritarian dimension.
The divide between the long-lived and well-established democracies and the recently 
democratized states of Southern and Eastern Europe can be regarded as the main finding 
of this thesis. Further research may pay particular attention to a more profound analysis 
of the left-right dimension and its usefulness for the societies of Southern and Eastern 
Europe, in order to examine the potential of the terms left and right to function as an  
overarching ideological heuristic across Europe.
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The present study examines the meaning of the left-right dimension across 21 European 
countries at the individual level. The terms left and right entered the vocabulary of the 
political arena in the aftermath of the French Revolution, where “right” used to denote  
the followers of the nobility, the clergy, and the defenders of the ancien régime, and 
“left” characterized the revolutionary bourgeoisie.
Ever since, major lines of social conflict in European societies have been absorbed by 
the political dichotomy. Through the course of the nation-building era, the religious-
secular cleavage became salient, in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, the socio-
economic class cleavage strongly shaped the political landscape across Europe, and in 
the second half  of  the twentieth  century,  value change fostered the emergence of  a  
libertarian-authoritarian cleavage. The left-right terminology has been used with respect 
to all three of these lines of conflict, denoting either social groups, political parties,  or 
value orientations which are of interest for the purpose of this study.
Accordingly,  I  present  a  three-dimensional  mode  of  operationalizing  the  value 
component of the left-right dimension. Data from the European Social Survey (Round 
4)  are  employed  to  examine  the  extent  to  which  religious,  socio-economic,  and 
libertarian-authoritarian  value  orientations  explain  left-right  self-placement  by 
individuals across countries. The outcomes obtained from these analyses are then used 
to discover commonalities and differences between the 21 countries in the data set.
The results show that (1) respondents in the Western and Northern parts of Europe link 
their  individual  value  orientations  to  the  left-right  terminology  in  a  much  more 
meaningful  way  than  citizens  in  Southern  and  Eastern  Europe,  especially  in  post-
communist societies; (2) the religious dimension of left-right is remarkably more salient 
in  the  mixed  belief  or  predominantly  Catholic  societies  of  Europe;  (3)  the  socio-
economic dimension continues to explain the largest share of variance of respondents’ 
left-right self-placement; (4) the libertarian-authoritarian dimension is the more salient  
the more economically developed a society.
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8.2. Abstract (German)
Die  vorliegende  Arbeit  untersucht  die  Bedeutung  der  Links-Rechts-Dimension  im 
Vergleich  von  21  europäischen  Ländern.  Die  Begriffe  links  und  rechts  wurden  im 
nachrevolutionären Frankreich erstmals politisch gebraucht. “Rechts” bezeichnete die 
Anhänger des Adels, des Klerus und die Verteidiger des ancien régime, demgegenüber 
meinte “links” die Vertreter des revolutionären Bürgertums.
Seit  damals  wurden  große  gesellschaftliche  Konfliktlinien  mit  der  Links-Rechts-
Dichotomie in Verbindung gebracht: Zur Zeit der Nationalstaatenbildung war vor allem 
die Cleavage zwischen religiösen und säkularen Interessen dominant; in der Folge der 
Industriellen  Revolution  trat  der  sozio-ökonomische  Klassenkonflikt  an  die  oberste 
Stelle der politischen Agenda; und im späten 20. Jahrhundert bekamen nicht-materielle 
Konfliktlinien  im  Spannungsfeld  zwischen  libertären  und  autoritären  Werthaltungen 
besondere  Bedeutung.  Mit  allen  drei  Cleavages  wurde  das  Links-Rechts-Schema in 
Verbindung gebracht,  sei  es im Bezug auf soziale Gruppen, politische Parteien oder 
ideologische Orientierungen, die hier von zentralem Interesse sind.
Dementsprechend  erfolgt  eine  dreidimensionale  Operationalisierung  der 
Wertorientierungskomponente des Links-Rechts-Schemas. Anhand von Daten aus dem 
European Social Survey (Vierte Runde) wird ländervergleichend untersucht, in welchem 
Ausmaß  religiöse,  sozio-ökonomische  und  libertär-autoritäre  Werthaltungen 
individuelle  Selbsteinstufung  auf  der  Links-Rechts-Skala  erklären.  Die  Ergebnisse 
dieser  Analysen  werden  anschließend  verwendet,  um  Gemeinsamkeiten  und 
Unterschiede zwischen Ländern und Ländergruppen in Europa zu identifizieren.
Es  zeigt  sich,  dass  (1)  Befragte  in  West-  und  Nordeuropa  ihre  Werteinstellungen 
sinnvoller mit der Links-Rechts-Dimension in Verbindung bringen als Personen in süd- 
und osteuropäischen Ländern, speziell im postkommunistischen Raum; (2) die religiöse 
Dimension  der  Links-Rechts-Dichotomie  in  katholischen  oder  katholisch-
protestantischen  Gesellschaften  weitaus  präsenter  ist  als  anderswo;  (3)  die  sozio-
ökonomische  Dimension  den  größten  Anteil  an  erklärter  Varianz  beisteuert;  (4)  die 
libertär-autoritäre Dimension umso stärker ausgeprägt ist, je höher die wirtschaftliche 
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